第二代EPCglobal 無線射頻 (RFID) 標準已被納入ISO 18000-6C並且被廣泛使用在物流業者。然而在它的通訊協定中,無線射頻標籤無法抵擋惡意掃描、側錄攻擊。過去針對短距離RFID的逆向工程攻擊顯示,這類的惡意攻擊是非常可行的,而在長距離環境中,這些威脅只會更大。其根本的原因在於缺乏認證協定。然而,因為RFID的計算和儲存能力都非常低,而且電力來自於讀取器的電磁感應,傳統的加密與認證機制並不適用。有一部分的研究在於簡化既有的加解密演算法來符合RFID硬體限制,另一些研究朝向提出輕量化的認證協定。而這些研究當中僅有部份是與EPCglobal標準前向相容,但硬體設備往往是導入RFID應用的主要門檻,特地為新應用更換既有設備不是理想的解法。 本論文探討各種輕量化認證協定並且提出一個相容於EPCglobal標準的認證協定--- $Gen2^{+}$。 我們提出的認證協定在步驟以及訊息格式大小都能符合標準,並能一定程度地防止惡意掃描和追蹤攻擊。
EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 specification (Gen2 in brief) has been approved as ISO18000-6C for global use, but the identity of tag (TID) is transmitted in plaintext which makes the tag traceable and cloneable. Several solutions have been proposed based on traditional encryption methods, such as symmetric or asymmetric ciphers, but they are not suitable for low-cost RFID tags. Recently, some lightweight authentication protocols conforming to Gen2 have been proposed. However, the message flow of these protocols is different from Gen2. Existing readers may fail to read new tags. In this thesis, we will propose a novel authentication protocol based on Gen2, called $Gen2^{+}$, for low-cost RFID tags. Our protocol follows every message flow in Gen2 to provide backward compatibility.