Mobile node privacy becomes one of the important research topics. However, these protocols providing mobile node privacy not only still leaks information on communication entities and routes but also lacks efficiency. Moreover, these protocols are vulnerable to active attacks, such as flooding attacks, reply attacks, and computational DoS attacks. In this work, we propose a location-based anonymous routing protocol (LASR) to provide mobile node privacy and resist active attacks. Our protocol utilizes the location of destination to increase the efficiency of route discovery and data transmission, moreover the locations of communication entities are not revealed in any packets. Our protocol is the first anonymous routing protocol which can resist the active attacks. Security analysis and simulations verify the effectiveness and efficiency of our simulations.
移動式節點的隱私性已經變成一個重要的研究議題。而在目前發表提供移動節點隱私性的協定中不只洩漏了通訊實體的資訊和路徑資訊而且還缺乏效率。再者這些協定易於遭受主動式攻擊,像是 flooding attacks, reply attacks, 和 computational DoS attacks。所以我們提出一個基於位置式匿名安全的路由協定去提供移動節點隱私性和抵擋主動式攻擊。我們的協定利用終點的位置資訊去增加路徑搜尋和資料傳輸的效率,而且通訊實體的位置不會在任何封包中被洩漏。此外我們的協定是第一個能夠減緩主動式攻擊的匿名繞路協定。安全分析和模擬證實我們協定的效率和效果。