《笛卡爾式的沉思錄》中的原初領域──論胡塞爾第五沉思中交互主體性理論之困局

The Primordial Sphere in Cartesian Meditations─ On the Problem of the Theory of Intersubjectivity in the Fifth Meditation

楊穎茜(Yang, Ying Chien)

指導教授 ： 吳俊業

國立清華大學/人文社會學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6843/NTHU.2013.00103

摘要

胡塞爾在《笛卡爾式的沉思錄》的第五沉思中，提出了一個相當完整的交互主體性之理論架構(Theorie der Intersubjektivität)。此篇論文以原初領域(die primordiale Sphäre)之概念為切入點，去展示此理論的理論設定以及其所蘊含的困局。在此篇論文，我提出主要三個問題：一，被規定為非陌異性(nicht-Fremdheit)的屬己性領域(die Eigenheitssphäre)是否可能成功？二，原本的原初領域是透過抽象懸擱(abstrakte Epoche)而獲得的，理應只是一個為了解釋上有效的概念，但是，到了他者建構分析時，屬己的原初領域變成是一個自我單子(Monade)的原初領域，並且要在自我單子之中建構出另一同樣作為單子的自我。那麼，原初領域究竟只是解釋上的概念，亦或實存上的概念？三，就他者議題而言，胡塞爾這種由自我去通達他者的方法，是否就能夠徹底地闡明與他者遭逢的經驗？在論文中，我將原初領域區分了靜態現象學(statische Phänomenologie)式與發生現象學(genetische Phänomenologie)式的概念，以回應我所提出的問題。我的結論有三：一，靜態現象學下，屬己性領域無法達到徹底排除陌異性的要求，如此的理論設定無法成功。二，發生現象學下，透過自身闡明所獲得的原初領域，無法被經驗地觀察到。此理論假設違反現象學闡明之精神。三，由自我闡明通往他者的方法論，承接著尋找確然明證之哲學基礎的理論目的。在如此的知識計畫下，他者無法帶來陌異性。

關鍵字

原初領域 ； 屬己性 ； 陌異性 ； 他者 ； 獨我論 ； 靜態現象學 ； 發生現象學 ； 原初性

並列摘要

In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl has showed us the structure of the theory of intersubjectivity. In this thesis, I focus on the concept of the primordial sphere to analyze the theoretical presuppositions and this implication of the theoretical problems. I have raised three main questions: (1) would it be possibly successful, that we could exclude out the non-alienness to achieve the pure ownness sphere? (2) The primordial sphere, which was firstly made by abstract epoché, would be a justifying concept of the explication of the theoretical foundation. But in the step of the constitutional analysis of the other, the sphere of ownness turns into a monad in the primordial sphere. In this way, is the primordial sphere a justifying concept or an ontological concept? (3) Concerning the theme of the other, could Husserl thoroughly explicate the experience of countering the other by the method which is from the explication of the ego to the explication of the existence of the other? In my thesis, in order to deal with the questions, I have distinguished the concept of the primordial sphere into the concept of static phenomenology and of the genetic phenomenology. From my discussions I have made three conclusions: (1) in static phenomenology, the claim, that the sphere of ownness should exclude all of the alienness, fails. (2) in genetic phenomenology, the primordial sphere, which is achieved by the self-explication, contravene the attitude of phenomenological research. (3) the methodology from the ego to the other receives the motivation from the project of the foundation of knowledge, which looks for the radical philosophical ground in the evidence of apodicticity. .

並列關鍵字

primordial sphere ； the ownness ； the alienness, the otherness ； the other ； solipsism ； static phenomenology ； genetic phenomenology ； reduction ； originality

參考文獻

吳俊業，<胡塞爾與他者問題──基本規模的闡釋與初步定位>。《哲學與文化》，第三十六卷第四期(2009, 04)，頁71-84。

Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology.

Translated by F.Kersten. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff publishers,1982.

──Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion

Cairns. 5th edition. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff publishers,1973.