論康德根本惡證明與詮釋困難

On the proof of Kant’s radical evil and the relating puzzle

陳哲謙(Che-Chien Chen)

指導教授 ： 鄭志忠

國立清華大學/人文社會學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2021年)

摘要

康德在《單純理性界線內的宗教》中提出人性「根本惡」的概念，並主張這命題需要「先天證明」或是人類學研究的「證實」。學者對此有所爭論。阿利森認為康德缺少根本惡的「正規證明」，所以，需要為其重構一個「先天證明」。伍德從康德人類學的觀點反對這一類的證明，並主張以「非社會的社會性」的概念解讀根本惡概念。在本文中，我從康德道德哲學的觀點詮釋人性中「向惡偏好」，並主張「偏好」是人類自由意欲設置違反道德法則之格律的一種主觀傾向。由於道德法則對主體而言必然是一項令式，所以這種主觀傾向無法根除，但是，它卻可以藉由德行的堅定決心而被克服其影響力。由於「人在本性上是惡的」是一個先天綜合命題，所以，需要一個「正規證明」。我認為阿利森將「偏好」與「存心」等同視之，會使得「道德善的存心」難以理解。我認為伍德以經驗人類學詮釋意欲的自由行動，是一種不恰當的概念化約。針對兩者的缺失，我以龐思奮與穆赫尼克提出的「準先驗證明」加以反駁。龐思奮主張康德的論證存在先驗證明的形式，所以並非經驗命題。穆赫尼克提出人在實踐活動中有一種心理上的侷限，容易將主觀的聯想次序視為客觀的連結次序。我認為穆赫尼克的詮釋有所缺失，因為以「心理上」解釋「向惡偏好」容易欠缺道德上的可歸責性。因此，我以「道德反思判斷力」補充穆赫尼克「準先驗證明」的不足。綜合以上論點，我主張康德的「根本惡」需要一個「準先驗證明」。

關鍵字

根本惡 ； 偏好 ； 存心 ； 非社會的社會性 ； 最高善 ； 先驗推證 ； 反思判斷力

並列摘要

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant claimed that the humanity is interwoven with “radical evil”, and explained that it needs “a priori argument” or “proofs” of anthropological investigation. Commentators get a great dispute about this. Allison asserted that Kant lacked his “formal proof” of radical evil, so we need to reconstruct a “a priori argument”. Wood objected to this kind of proof from the viewpoint of Kant’s anthropology. According to Wood, radical evil can be explained by “unsocial sociability”. My main thesis from the viewpoint of Kantian moral philosophy is that “propensity to evil” as a deed of free power of choice is a subjective tendency which disobeys moral law. Since the moral law is necessarily an imperative to the subject, this subjective tendency cannot be eradicated. The influence of this tendency can be overcome by the firm determination of virtue. Since “man is evil by nature” is a priori synthetic proposition, a “formal proof” is needed. Allison and Wood both made some mistakes on this interpretation. Allison equated “propensity” with “disposition”, which makes the “morally good disposition” difficult to understand. Wood's empirical anthropological interpretation of deed of the power of choice is an inappropriate reduction. Palmquist and Muchnik both argued that Kant’s thesis of “radical evil” needs a “quasi-transcendental argument”. Palmquist claimed that Kant’s form of argument is transcendental, so it is not empirical proposition. Muchnik put forward that it is one of the psychological limitations of our faculty of practical reason to invert the objective order of connection and replace it by our subjective order of association. I point out that the interpretation of “psychology” is questionable, because the “the propensity to evil” needs moral accountability. Therefore, I supplement Muchnik’s “quasi-transcendental argument” with “moral reflective judgment”. Taken together, I argue that Kant's “radical evil” needs a “quasi-transcendental argument”.

並列關鍵字

Radical Evil ； Propensity ； Unsocial Sociability ； Disposition ； The Highest Good ； Transcendental Deduction ； The Reflecting Power of Judgment

參考文獻

康德著作

Kant, Immanuel. (1996). In Allen W. Wood, and George di Giovanni, (Ed.), Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

─── (1997). In Peter Heath, and J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

─── (1998). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, trans. Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

─── (1999). In Bernd Kraft, and Dieter Schönecker (Ed.), Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Hamburg: Meiner.