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  • 學位論文

考慮公平性因素下雙通路供應鏈的定價策略

Pricing Policies in Dual Channel Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns

指導教授 : 溫于平

摘要


過往關於通路整合的研究通常以利益或財富函數的最大化作為唯一目標。然而,這樣單純的模型卻往往會因為一些隱含的原因而使其偏離其最佳決策,這種現象被稱作為「有限理性」。近年研究中,「公平性」已被廣泛用以解釋決策者的有限理性行為。崔海濤教授等人於2007年提出之研究論文將公平性因素納入傳統二元模型的通路協調中,並發現當考慮了公平性的因素後,我們可以藉由設定簡單之批發價格來達成通路整合並最大化整體利益。其研究亦證明了在導入公平性的考量後,零售商將會犧牲其自身之部分利潤來懲罰或獎勵製造商在設定批發價格之公平度。 在本論文中,我們將公平性考量導入一具有網路通路的雙通路供應鏈模型。本論文探討的供應通路模型主要由單一製造商以及單一零售商所形成。製造商銷售產品至零售商,零售商透過傳統通路來販售加值性產品給顧客;同時製造商可透過自有的網路通路直接銷售產品給消費者。首先,我們分析了零售商在對應製造商所訂定之批發價格過高或過低時,零售商因考量公平性而會有偏離傳統完全理性下的決策。另一方面,我們討論零售商對於不同公平性程度的要求會對製造商的整體利益的影響,並提供對應不同公平性程度下的定價策略。最後,我們發現當零售商考量公平性時,雙通路供應鏈能夠比崔海濤教授等人提出的傳統二元通路模型更容易達成製造商與零售商之整合來使供應鏈利益最大化。

並列摘要


Previous research works focused on profit or monetary payoff maximization as the decision maker’s sole objective in coordinating the channel. However, the decision maker may deviate from his best response for some implicit reasons, which is called boundedly rational behaviors. Recently, fairness has been widely used to explain why the decision maker will have these incompletely rational behaviors. Cui et al. (2007) introduced fairness concerns into channel coordination in a dyadic model setting. The author showed that a simple wholesale price contract is still effective in coordinating the channel when fairness is involved. They demonstrated that the retailer would sacrifice his own profit to punish or reward the manufacturer’s wholesale price setting. In this thesis, we extend fairness concerns to a dual model setting, where the manufacturer can sell products to customers directly. Firstly, we analyze the retailer’s pricing strategy and find out the retailer would deviate from his profit maximized decision when the manufacturer’s wholesale price is too high or too low. Furthermore, it's discussed that the influence on manufacturers' profit brought by the different degrees of fairness the retailer requests, and we propose appropriate corresponding strategies for the manufacturer to adopt. Besides, based on the results, we find out that the dual channel setting requires less stringent condition to achieve coordination when only the retailer is fairness concerned.

參考文獻


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