庫藏股與公司股價、員工分紅配股及投資支出關聯性之研究-以台灣上市公司為例

The Relationship among Share Repurchase, Stock Price, Employee Stock Ownership, and Corporate Investment: An Empirical Study on Taiwan Listed Companies

莊澄祥(Cheng-Hsiang Chuang)

指導教授 ： 胡為善

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2003年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200300274

摘要

庫藏股制度在國外已行之有年，但台灣於民國89年才正式啟動，且與國外的制度也不盡相同，因此本研究以89至91年國內實施庫藏股之上市公司為對象，首先以事件研究法探討庫藏股宣告之市場反應，接著以「橫斷面與時間序列合併資料」（Panel data）之迴歸模型探討庫藏股與員工分紅配股之間的關係，並進一步對影響公司實施庫藏股的相關因素進行實證。最後，探討企業實施庫藏股是否會對投資支出造成排擠效果。

在市場反應方面，實證結果發現：（1）國內上市公司宣告買回庫藏股後，股價有顯著正向的反應，且宣告買回後第一日之異常報酬達到最大；（2）在產業別之比較上，電子業的宣告效果最不明顯，而金融業有資訊洩露的跡象；（3）在不同買回目的方面，目的三（維護股權）的宣告效果大於目的一（轉讓員工），但目的一的效應期間卻較目的三為長；（4）不同實施次數比較方面，結果並不顯示宣告效果會隨著次數的增加呈現遞增或遞減的現象，但實施次數愈多的公司有部分提前反應的現象。若與金融業的結果對照，更能說明實施次數愈多，訊息洩露的情形愈明顯。

在影響公司買回庫藏股之因素方面，實證結果顯示，公司當年度若有實施員工分紅配股，則當年度庫藏股買回總額會相對減少，但當年度以前若連續三年皆有實施分紅配股，則買回庫藏股總額愈多，符合盈餘稀釋假說與經理人動機假說。至於其他公司特性方面，規模愈大、投資機會愈小，公司愈可能買回庫藏股。

在投資支出排擠效果之實證結果發現，買回庫藏股對企業長期投資並無影響，但對短期投資、資本支出及研發費用皆為負相關，表示將資金挪用於庫藏股的買回，除了長期投資之外，會使企業的短期投資、資本支出與研發費用相對減少，故實施庫藏股對企業投資支出具有排擠作用。

關鍵字

庫藏股 ； 事件研究 ； 橫斷面與時間序列合併資料 ； 員工分紅配股 ； 企業投資 ； 宣告效果

並列摘要

Share repurchase system has been implemented abroad for years, but it was formally implemented in Taiwan until 2000. However, the system in Taiwan is different with it in other countries. Therefore, this study take public listed companies implementing share repurchase system during 2000 to 2002 in Taiwan as samples. First, we use event study to investigate the market reacts on the announcement of share repurchase, and then we use regression model with panel data to explore the relationship between share repurchase and employee stock ownership, and we investigate the related factors influencing the implementation of share repurchase. Finally, we explore whether the implementation of share repurchase will cause the reduction in investing expenditure or not.

Referring to market reacts, we find that (1) when the public listed companies announce to repurchase shares, stock price revealed positive reaction significantly, and the abnormal returns are maximized on the day after announcement day, (2) To compare with different industries, unapparent announcement effect are showed in electronic industries and the facts of information leakage in financial industries, (3) on aspects of the different purposes of repurchasing, the announcement effect for firms aimed at retaining the interests of shareholders’ equity as buyback purpose is found to be larger than that for transfer to employees as purpose, but transfer to employees as purpose has longer lasting span than retain the interests of shareholders’ equity as purpose, (4) on the comparison of different implementation times, the results didn’t show announcement effect accelerate or diminish along with the augmentation of implementation times, but those companies which implements more showed anticipated reaction. If comparing with financial industries, this explains more implementation times results in significant information leakage.

Referring to the factors influencing companies to repurchase shares, we find if a company implements employee stock ownership in the same year, the total amounts of share repurchases will be decreased, but if a company implements employee stock ownership for three consecutive years before repurchase, the total amounts of share repurchases will increase. It is consistent with the earning diluted hypothesis and management incentive hypothesis. As for other company features, the larger the company is, the less the investment opportunities will be, the company is more inclined to repurchase shares.

On the part of investing expenditure, we find that share repurchase can not influence companies’ long-term investment but has negative relationship with short-term investment, capital expenditure and R&D expense, which reveals that diverting funds to share repurchase will cause the decrease of short-term investment, capital expenditure and R&D expense except for long-term investment, hence the implementation of share repurchase will cause the reduction in investing expenditure.

並列關鍵字

Event Study ； Announcement Effect ； Profit Sharing and Stock Ownership ； Corporate Investment ； Share Repurchase ； Panel Data

參考文獻

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