醫院負責人必須為醫師對醫院經營績效影響之分析性研究

The Analytic Research on The Impacts of The Hospital Director Must Being Physician to The Hospital's Operating Performance

王聯文(Lian-Wen Wang)

指導教授 ： 鄒 翊

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400079

摘要

本研究係以醫療機構負責人必須為醫師之現行醫療法規定下，沿用代理理論文獻之典範(如Holmstrom，1979，1991)，建立一個單期代理模型，作為分析醫師院長在面對擔任醫療院所的經營管理者與實際從事醫療服務工作之雙重職能角色下，分別面臨不同的工作報酬與工作風險，其人力資源的投入決策將如何影響醫院的經營管理績效。希望能藉由本分析探討所得之結果，協助解決主理人與代理人潛在的利益衝突之代理問題，進而如何制定適合之獎酬契約，以達雙方效用之極大化。
本研究結果，若醫師院長的產出雜訊程度越高，則誘因強度越低；若誘因強度越高，則醫師院長的努力程度越大。因此本研究認為，「醫院負責人必須為醫師」之規定，對醫院經營績效的影響關係是，醫師院長於從事醫務管理工作以及醫療服務工作時，二者所分別面臨的工作之不確定性以及誘因強度，是影響醫療機構經營績效的重要因素之一。

關鍵字

剩餘價值 ； 誘因強度 ； 代理理論 ； 風險趨避

並列摘要

This research is based on the current medical law about the directors of medical treatment agencies must also have doctor position, using the paradigm of agency theory documents, to build up a single period agency model, to analyze that when a doctor not only does medical treatment services, but also be a president of a hospital, it will face different rewards and risks and how the decision of the human resource investment will affect the hospital’s operating performance.
By way of the analysis result of this research, to deal with the agency problem about the potential interests conflict between a owner and a agent, and then establish a proper rewarding agreement, to maximize the utilities of both sides.
The result of this research is that the more indefinite outcome messages of the hospital director are, the less intensive of the invitations. If the intensive degree of the incentive is stronger, then the effort degree by the hospital director will be greater. Therefore, this research concluded, the influence on the hospital’s operating performance which under the rule of “the hospital director must be a physician” is, when the hospital director dealing with medical manage matters and medical treatment services, the uncertainties and invitation degrees between these two jobs are the major factors of affecting hospital’s operating performance.

並列關鍵字

incentive intensity ； risk averse ； agency theory ； residual value

參考文獻

黃月桂，張保隆，李延春，1996，台北市立綜合醫院經營績效之評估，中華衛誌，第15期。

楊志良，1996，健康保險，台北巨流圖書公司。

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