董事會屬性、董事會功能與 企業經營績效之關聯性研究

A Study on the Relationship among the Attributes, Functions of Boards of Directors and Corporate Performance

趙維穎(WeiYing Chao)

指導教授 ： 高孔廉 ； 胡為善

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400532

摘要

本研究旨在了解台灣上市公司獨立董監事實施之現況，以台灣股票上市公司為問卷調查對象，排除金融產業類股及資料不全者，共計郵寄569份問卷，並回收70份有效問卷，回收率為10.54％。本研究採取敘述統計、變異數分析、相關分析及迴歸分析等方法，探討上市公司之董事會屬性、功能及企業經營績效間的關係。
過去研究多探討董事會屬性及其與經營績效的關係，屬於較靜態之研究，本研究則加入董事會的運作及其功能，從動態的角度研究其與經營績效間的關係。首先，本研究將董事會屬性分為組成、結構及運作三構面，而其中董事會的組成由有無設置獨立董監事制度、選任方式、身分作為衡量變數；董事會的結構則由董事會下設置專責委員會衡量之；董事會運作的變數則包括董事會議程安排、董事所得會前資訊、董事互動情況、董事酬勞、及評估董事績效。至於董事會功能則分為控制、策略、服務及資源四項。最後，以資產報酬率及股東權益報酬率作為企業經營績效的衡量變數。
本研究發現目前上市公司普遍未設獨立董監事及下屬專責委員會，且董事會運作時，近47.15％的公司之議程由代表經營權的公司內部經營者安排、董事所得會前資訊仍不夠周全，再者，據調查發現公司多認為未來董事會應扮演更重要的角色，尤其希望董事會更能多發揮控制及策略方面的功能，也就是董事會應扮演防弊及興利的角色。
本研究彙總結果如下：（1）設置獨立董監事並不能顯著提升董事會功能，但已設置獨立董監事的公司其經營績效優於未設置者；（2）董事會下設置委員會得以提升董事會的資源功能，但未能提升企業經營績效；（3）董事會前取得資訊數目越多，則董事會策略及控制功能發揮的越好；（4）董事會的策略及資源功能發揮的越好，企業經營績效越佳，而董事會的控制及服務功能對企業經營績效並無顯著影響。
綜而言之，在董事會功能及企業經營績效部分，本研究發現董事會策略及資源功能發揮越好，其企業經營績效越佳，而在董事會屬性及績效部分，本研究發現設置獨立董監事者，績效較高。換言之，設置獨立董監事並發揮資源及策略功能，企業經營績效較佳，但此結果與設置獨立董監事及設置薪酬、稽核等委員會之目的在發揮董事的控制功能之期望並不符合，顯示主管機關如要獨立董監事發揮預期之公司治理功能，則必須訂定獨立董監事執行業務準則。此外，政府並應定期評鑑並公佈各公司之公司治理現況，且要求公司合理訂定董事酬勞。最後，企業應透過改善董事會屬性如引進獨立董監事制度、設置委員會、提供董事充足的會前資訊、結合董事酬勞與董事績效並營造良好的公司治理文化，以增進董事會功能，進而提升經營績效。

關鍵字

獨立董事 ； 董事會功能 ； 董事會屬性 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to investigate the status of independent board directors in Taiwan. A total of 569 questionnaires were sent and 70 effective returns were received. This work surveys the publicly company excluding the financial and insurance company in Taiwan. The methods used including descriptive statistics, ANOVA analysis, correlation analysis and regressions methods. Since most of the previous researches focused on the relationship between the attributes of the board and the corporate performance, which implies a relatively static approach, this investigation looks at the problem from a dynamic point of view by adding the operation and function of the board. Firstly, the board’s attributes also consist of three parts as composition, structure and operational process. The composition of boards includes establishment, selection and backgrounds of independent board members. The structure of board is measured by the specific purpose committee. The operational process is arranged by board meeting agenda and information provided to the directors, interaction between boards’ directors, and the salary of boards of directors. Secondly, the boards’ function consists of control, strategy, service and resources. Finally, the operational performance is measured by the rate of return on asset and that on equity.
This study found that most companies did not have independent directors or set up specific purpose committee under the board. Nearly half of the company’s board meeting agenda are arranged by the executives of the company. Most of the directors do not have adequate information before the meeting of the board. Referring to the board’s function, the results showed that the executives of most companies suggest that directors should play more important roles than before, especially in control and strategy function.
The results are summarized as follows:
（1） Independent directors did not improve board’s function significantly, but their performance outperforms the companies that do not have independent directors.
（2） Regarding the companies which having specific-purpose committees, their resource functions are improved yet, but their performance did not have much progress.
（3） The more the information the director has before the meeting starts, the better the performances of the strategy and control function are.
（4） The better of the performances of the strategy and the resource functions of the directors of the board are, the better the operational performance of the company is.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； independent directors ； boards’ function ； boards’ attributes

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