委託書決定因素及委託書與盈餘管理之關聯性研究

The study of decision factors of proxy contest and the relationship between proxy contest and earnings management

高宏鎰(hong-yi gao)

指導教授 ： 林維珩

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400542

摘要

近幾年來國際大廠如Enron、World com、Xerox等，接二連三地宣佈財務危機、甚至破產。究其原因，除了公司內部稽核單位和董事會未能善監督職責外，也透露出股東（或投資人）、經理人（即代理人）之間存在著嚴重的代理問題（agency problem），並突顯出公司治理（corporate governance）制度設計與執行效能的重要性和急迫性。

本研究則試著就世界銀行(1999)所提出的公司治理架構中，試圖就外部監督機制中的委託書機制提出來加以探討，並藉以驗證下列三個問題:

一、在我國證券市場上，有哪些因素將導致我國上市（櫃）公司發生委託書徵求？
二、就未改選的股東常會及董監改選的股東常會中，公司派是否盈餘管理的方式，以利其委託書之取得？
三、就未改選的股東常會及董監改選的股東常會中，當公司派對委託書的需求愈強烈時，是否愈會以盈餘管理的方式，以利其委託書之取得？

本研究之結論彙總如下：
一、包括公司是否屬集團企業、上期是否發生委託書徵求、股票週轉率、股價淨值比、流通在外股數、股東人數、大股東持股比率及平均董監持股數等八個項目。對於我國上市櫃公司是否發生委託書徵求，最具有解釋力。
二、我國上市（櫃）公司，以盈餘管理的方式，以利其委託書之取得的假設，未能獲得證實。特別是當公司處於董監改選股東會的第四季時，其盈餘管理的程度，將更顯得保守。
三、就委託書的需求程度來看，公司派於一般股東會時，即使其徵求委託書的壓力並不大，其還是會從事盈餘管理的工作，以利其目的之達成。特別是當內部人持股比率愈大時，公司派愈會利用盈餘管理的方式，以取得其它股東對其信任，進而達到股東會能順利進行的目的。

關鍵字

委託書 ； 盈餘管理

並列摘要

Recently, many companies such as Enron, World com. Xerox et. al. announced the financial distress and bankruptcy. Owning to unresposibility of the auditors and independent director, and agency problem existing in the firms, it exhibits the importance and exigency of establishing and exercising corporate governance.

This research tried to use the framework of corporate governance in Worldbank to analyze the proxy contest system from external monitoring mechanisms in order to identify the three questions:
1. Which factors will influence the occurring of proxy contest in the public-listed firms?
2. In the stockholders’ regular meetings, does the manager manipulate earnings in order to access the proxy contest?
3. In the stockholders’ regular meetings, if the manager has more motives to access the proxy contest, does he will be more intense to manipulate earnings?

The conclusions in the research are following：

1. Such as business group, having occurring of proxy contest last quarter, stock turnover ratio, P/E ratio, share of outstanding stock issued, the number of stockholders, the ownership ratio of block shareholders and average ownership ratio of independent director and supervisor, which one will be more explanation to the occurring of proxy contest?
2. It can’t prove that the manager will manipulate earnings to access proxy contest in this research, especially when the firm is in the forth quarter, the degree of manipulating earnings is more conservation.
3.According to the level of requirement of proxy contest, the manager will manipulate earnings even if he have no pressure to access proxy contest. When the insider’s ownership is greater than other investors, the managers will manipulate earnings in order to obtain other shareholders’ trust and make the stockholders’ regular meeting end perfectly.

並列關鍵字

proxy contest ； earnings management

參考文獻

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