公司治理與強制性財務預測資訊移轉

Corporate Governance and Information Transfers of Mandatory Management Forecasts

陳秉逢(Ping-Feng Chen)

指導教授 ： 林維珩

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500370

摘要

摘　要
本研究針對同公司先後發布的財務資訊及同產業內先後發布的財務預測進行研究，探討先後發布的財務資訊的宣告效果是否有顯著差異，並從公司治理機制的好壞探討財務資訊的可靠性是否會影響財務資訊的宣告效果及資訊移轉效果，並分別以t檢定、無母數檢定與迴歸模型進行檢測。
研究結果發現，先發布的財務預測的宣告效果顯著大於後發布的季盈餘的宣告效果，與Liu(1995)的實證結果相符，而先發布的季盈餘的宣告效果則顯著小於後發布的財務預測的宣告效果，推測原因為本研究之財務預測樣本多為更新樣本，所傳遞的資訊較為強烈，因此產生後發布的財務預測的宣告效果反而大於先發布的季盈餘的宣告效果。
同產業內先後發布的財務預測的宣告效果在未以公司治理機制好壞進行分組前並未存在顯著差異，在以公司治理機制好壞進行分組之後，先後發布財務預測公司之公司治理皆佳及先後發布財務預測公司之公司治理皆不佳的樣本未出現先發布的財務預測的宣告效果顯著大於後發布者的狀況，而在先發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制佳而後發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制不佳以及先發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制不佳而後發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制佳的樣本中則呈現公司治理機制好的公司發布的財務預測的宣告效果顯著大於公司治理機制不好的公司發布的財務預測的宣告效果，顯示公司治理機制的好壞確實會影響到財務預測的宣告效果。
公司治理與資訊移轉效果的迴歸分析結果則顯示同產業間確實存在資訊移轉效果，而先後發布財務預測公司的公司治理指標皆會影響資訊移轉的強度，先發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制越好，財務預測帶來的資訊移轉效果越強，而後發布財務預測公司的公司治理機制越好，被移轉的強度則越小。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 財務預測 ； 資訊移轉

並列摘要

Abstract
This paper examines the announcement effect of firm’s sequential financial information and sequential financial information in the industry, and tries to test whether there is a significant difference between the announcement effects of sequential financial information. Besides, this paper examines whether corporate governance mechanism has influence on the announcement effect of financial information and the effect of information transfers by using T-test , nonparametric test and regression model.
The result is consistent with Liu (1995) , the announcement effect of the earlier management forecasts are significantly stronger than those of the sequencing quarterly earnings announcement. Unexpectedly, it shows that the announcement effects of the earlier quarterly earnings announcements are significantly weaker than those of the sequencing management forecasts. Perhaps it’s because most of the forecasts samples in this paper are revision which may bring stronger information content so that sequencing forecasts bring more information than earlier quarterly earnings announcements do.
Before grouping into different samples by corporate governance mechanism, the announcement effects between the sequential financial information in the industry do not exist a significant difference. After grouping into different samples by corporate governance mechanism, the announcement effects of the groups which both the corporate governance mechanism of firms are good and both corporate governance mechanism of firms are bad do not exist a significant difference. While there’s a significant difference between the announcement effects of the sequential forecasts in the industry if the corporate governance mechanism of firms that announce forecasts earlier is good(bad) and the corporate governance mechanism of firms that announce forecasts later is bad(good).
The result of regression shows that there’s information transfer effect within the industry and the corporate governance mechanism has influence on the strength of the information transfer. The better the corporate governance mechanism of firms that announce forecasts earlier, the stronger the effect of the information transfer is.

並列關鍵字

management forecasts ； information transfer ； corporate governance

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