- 學位論文
我國各地方縣市政府經營績效評估
The performance evaluation of the local goverment in Taiwan, Republic of China
摘要
政府部門的效率評估，一直無法以政府經費支出與所提供服務的投入產出關係作為 衡量的基準，本研究試圖建立地方縣市政府經費支出之投入與所提供服務的關係，由過 去重產出輕投入的效率評估方式，改變為投入產出並重的效率評估方式，並對我國25 個地方縣市政府（2 個直轄市、臺灣省及連江省合計23 個縣市）民國93 年至98 年經營 績效衡量進行探討。第一階段運用DEA 及FDH 兩種不同模式，以PEST（政治、經濟、社 會、科技）架構分析，各地方縣市政府之相對效率表現，投入項為：一般政務支出及退 休撫卹支出、經濟發展支出、社會福利支出及社區發展環境保護支出、教育科學文化支 出等4 項；以國中小學生師比、道路長度、觀光遊憩區遊客人數、圾垃處理量等4 項變 數作為產出項。研究結果顯示：有高投入、高產出的縣市及低投入、中產出的縣市，同 列於理論效率前緣邊界，同為最具效率的縣市。第二階段於PEST 分析架構下，以Tobit 模型進行迴歸分析，並以與政治性、經濟性、社會性及科技性攸關的解釋變數，包括： 人口、土地面積、所得水準、教育水準、非農業人口比例、都會市化程度、老年人口比 例、身心障礙人口比例、低收入人口比例、失業率等10 項變數，以及4 項虛擬變數： 地方首長是否與總統同一政黨、地方議會是否有一政黨過半數、地方政府是否為一致政 府、地方首長是否為連任等，作為影響地方縣市政府支出效率之因素。迴歸結果呈現： 非農業人口比例、老年人口比例、失業率具負向影響；低收入人口比例、地方首長是否 與總統同一政黨、地方議會是否有一政黨過半數為正向影響。人口、土地面積、所得水 準、都會市化程度呈現正負向的影響，但其具統計顯著性部分與理論預期相符。教育水 準、身心障礙人口比例、地方政府是否為一致政府、地方首長是否為連任皆呈現正負向 的影響，但皆不具統計顯著性。綜上顯示我國地方縣市政府經營效率，於PEST 分析架 構下，明顯受到非農業人口比例、老年人口比例、失業率、低收入人口比例、地方首長 是否與總統同一政黨、地方議會是否有一政黨過半數等變數之影響。
關鍵字
績效評估並列摘要
The government performance evaluation can not be evaluated by the relationship between governments』 expenditure and the outcomes of providing service for a long time. In this study、we try to form the relationship between the local governments』 expenditure and the providing service of government by changing the evaluation model from emphasizing outcomes rather than inputs into having equal weighting in both ways. The operating efficiency of the 25 local governments、(including 2 District Cities、Counties in Taiwan and Lenchian Provinces) in the period of 2004 to 2009 was investigated. In the first stage、the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) methods incorporated with PEST (Politic、Economic、Society、and Technology) structure were used to analyze the relative performance of local governments. Four items including general administrative expense and retire pension expanse、economical development expense、social benefit expanse and community development environment protection expanse、and educational scientific culture expanse are applied as inputs; four variables including the ratio between teachers and students in middle and elementary school、road length、the number of visitors in sight seeing spots、and the handling quantity of garbage are chosen as outputs. The results shows that those counties with having high inputs and high outputs and those counties with low inputs but middle outputs are ranking in the leading edge theoretical performance and also they are the most efficient counties. In second stage、under PEST structure、the TOBIT model was used to perform the recursive analysis. Ten explaining variables、related to politic、economic, socialism and scientific technology、such as population、land area、income level、education level、ratio of non-agriculture population、metro city level、ratio of older population、ratio of disable population、ratio of low income population、ratio of jobless were used. Four virtual variables such as same party belonging between local governor and president、overwhelming local council in one party、local government and council in one party、and reelected local governor were used to affect the local governments』 expenditure efficiency. The recursive analysis results show that ratio of non-agriculture population、ratio of older population、and ratio of jobless own negative effects. Ratio of low income population、same party belonging III between local governor and president、and overwhelming local council in one party own positive effect. Population、land area、income level、and metro city level are appearing with both positive and negative effects、but statistically consistent with theoretical prediction. Education level、ratio of disable population、local government and council in one party、and reelected local governor are appearing with both positive and negative effects、and without statistically consistency. From this study、we conclude that the local governments』 expenditure efficiency under PEST structure are effected by non-agriculture population、ratio of older population、ratio of jobless、ratio of low income population、same party belonging between local governor and president、and overwhelming local council in one party.