庫藏股買回及高階經理人權益誘因

REPURCHASES AND CEO EQUITY INCENTIVE

武越嶺(VIET-LINH VU)

指導教授 ： 陳昭蓉

中原大學/商學院/國際商學碩士學位學程/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201300213

摘要

摘要
本文探討經理人股權誘因效果及資本結構對買回庫藏股之影響，並進一步探討不同之股權誘因效果下，市場投資人對於宣告買回庫藏股之反應。本文以2000年至2012年台灣上市及上櫃公司為樣本(不含金融保險證券業)，實證結果發現，當經理人股權誘因效果愈強，愈可能宣告買回庫藏股，且當公司負債比率低於負債門檻時，股權誘因效果愈高，越可能買回庫藏股，支持買回庫藏股以調整資本結構之論點；但當負債比率高於負債門檻時，股權誘因效果愈高，越不會買回庫藏股。本文進一步發現，相較於低股權誘因之公司，高股權誘因之公司宣告買回庫藏股時，市場反應較差，因此累積異常報酬較低。

關鍵字

異常報酬 ； 經理人股權誘因 ； 庫藏股 ； 槓桿

並列摘要

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between CEO equity incentive and stock repurchase. I investigate the relation between stock repurchase and CEO incentive, optimal capital structure, and abnormal return over the 2000 to 2012 period. I point out three substantive problems samplings of early studies. First, I found that firm is more likely open market stock repurchases announcement following CEO high equity incentive. Second, as some firms frequently announce repurchase programs, firms are less repurchasing stocks when their debt outstanding is above their debt target. Firms are likely tradeoff open market stock repurchase when they want to adjust capital structure. Third, high CEO incentive may use share repurchase announcement to send a false or conflicting message regarding firm value to the capital market. Using data from Taiwan listed firms, I find that wealth effect of share repurchases and also CEO incentive is positive related stock repurchases announcements that CEO compensation is increased by raising stock price. I find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage, and face more severe financial constraint. This result also supports that firms with high CEO incentive announce repurchase, the investors perceive that announcement of repurchase is only benefit managers or blockholders, not whole shareholders. These findings provide the reasonable explanation of why firms are more likely open market stock repurchase announcements.

並列關鍵字

Abnormal Return ； Leverage ； Repurchase ； CEO incentive

參考文獻

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