由於企業赴海外投資導致財務報表複雜化,造成公司的管理者與股東間資訊不對稱的情況愈嚴重,加上管理者有誘因藉由其所持有的控制權來影響海外投資的策略,因而產生企業赴海外投資投機性的決策,其可能影響公司價值,因此本研究主要目的為探討公司海外同業投資對公司市場價值的影響,並檢視同時存在傳統代理問題及核心代理問題對海外同業投資與公司市場價值關聯性之調節效果。本研究以2000年到2013年之上市櫃公司為研究對象,實證結果發現:(1)海外投資的產業若與本業相似,對公司市場價值呈正相關,顯示若公司至海外所轉投資的項目與本身從事的行業有關,對公司市場價值會有正向的影響。(2)同時存在傳統及核心代理問題之公司,相較於僅有其中一種代理問題之公司,企業從事海外同業投資與公司市場價值之正向關係會下降,換句話說當企業同時存在傳統及核心代理問題時,造成管理階層執行海外轉投資策略,存有不良的誘因隱匿公司真實的價值,而減少公司市場價值。
Foreign investment complicates the financial statements which results in serious problem of information asymmetry between the managers and the shareholders. Since the managers have the incentive to influence the strategy of foreign investment with their right of control, the speculative decision of foreign investment is made within the corporates.This study aims to investigate the impact of company’s foreign investment on firm value, and to examine whether the coexistence of central agency problems and traditional agency problems affect the relevance between foreign investment and firm value. The sample of this study is the listed companies in Taiwan from 2000 to 2013..Empirical result shows that a foreign investment can increase company’s market value if the investment industry is similar to the company’s industry, indicating that the foreign investment is related with company’s business, it will have positive influence on company’s market value. Secondly, compared with the company which solely has either traditional or central agency problem, the company with coexistence of central agency problems and traditional agency problems has decreased the positive relation between foreign investment and firm value. In other words, when the corporate simultaneously has the traditional and central agency problems, the managers have incentive to hide company’s real value while executing foreign investment strategy, which further decreases firm value.