根據融資順位理論及自由現金流量假說之論點,現金持有對公司價值(即現金持有價值)之影響方向並不一致,本研究則從經理人之獎酬制度出發,探討經理人股權誘因效果對公司現金持有價值之影響。本研究以台灣上市、櫃公司為研究對象,樣本期間為1996年至2013年。 實證結果顯示,當經理人之股權誘因效果越大時,公司現金持有價值會越高,由此可知公司給予經理人股權誘因可以誘使經理人與公司利益為一致之關係,股權誘因之效果可以降低代理問題,使經理人為了個人之利益因此更會為公司提高公司價值,因此經理人不會濫用現金,而更會善加利用公司所持有之現金,使公司價值提高。本文更進一步發現股權誘因與現金持有價值存在非線性關係。
According to pecking order theory and free cash flow hypothesis, the impacts on the value of corporate cash holdings are mixed. From the aspect of the reward system of the managers, this study investigates the impact of the managers equity incentives on the value of corporate cash holdings. This study takes Taiwanese listed and OTC companies from 1996 to 2013 as samples. Empirical result shows that, when the effect of equity incentives of managers is increasingly large, the value of corporate cash holdings becomes higher. From this point, the manager’s equity incentives aligned the interest of managers and shareholders. The impact of the equity incentives can reduce agency problems and motive managers maximize firm value. Therefore, managers do not abuse cash and even take good advantage of the corporate cash, making the value of corporate going up. This study also finds that there is an nonlinear relation between equity incentives and the value of cash holdings.