重大訊息揭露缺失與投資人反應之研究

A Study Of Material Information Disclosure Weaknesses Failure And Investors' Reaction

陳慧智(Hui-Chih Chen)

指導教授 ： 陳昭蓉

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201300245

摘要

當一家公司發生重大交易之事項，卻未依法令之規定，按時完成公告重大訊息之處理程序，而被處以罰鍰，此即為重大訊息缺失。為了解市場投資人對該訊息之反應及發生重大訊息之原因，固本文探討以下問題：（一）上市（櫃）公司發生重大訊息缺失時，對其股價是否產生負向反應？（二）當上市（櫃）公司發生重大訊息缺失時，股票市場是否會因公司治理的良窳而給予不同之評價?（三）公司治理的良窳是否會影響上市（櫃）公司發生重大訊息缺失之可能性？
本研究使用2010年與2011年發生重大訊息缺失之公司為樣本，並使用事件研究法檢測當公司發生重大訊息缺失時市場投資人之反應，實證結果發現，當公司發生重大訊息缺失而被公開揭露並處以罰鍰時，市場上的投資人均會給予負向反應之股價。再將重大缺失樣本依公司治理變數做分組檢定，檢測投資人對於重大訊息缺失之反應是否因為公司治理機制而有所不同，實證結果發現，投資人對有設置獨立董事與成長性較高之公司，較會給予較高之評價進而減緩股價負向之效果。而當公司董事長兼任CEO與更換董事會成員時，較會增強股價負向之反應。本文更進一步以Probit模式檢測公司治理機制對發生重大訊息缺失之影響，結果發現，當董監事持股率愈多，董事會成員出席開會的次數愈高與公司資產報酬率愈高時，公司發生重大訊息缺失的機率愈低，家族董事在董事會席次愈多，公司規模愈大時，公司發生重大訊息缺失的機會亦愈高。

關鍵字

事件研究法 ； 公司治理結構 ； 重大訊息缺失

並列摘要

A material information disclosure failure (MIDF) is referred to an event that a firm is fined due to her failure to announce in time the information of a material transaction in compliance with the procedures required by laws. In order to understand how investors respond to and the underlying causes of MIDFs, this study investigates the following questions: (1) Would stock prices of a listed firm have a negative response, when the firm incurs an MIDF? (2) Would the stock market gives a different valuation on a firm’s stock according to the soundness of the firm’s corporate governance, when the firm incurs an MIDF? (3) Would the soundness of a firm’s corporate governance have an impact on the probability of incurring an MIDF of a listed firm?
This study uses a sample of Taiwan listed firms incurring MIDF for the years of 2010 and 2011, and applies the methodology of the event study to examine how investors respond to MIDFs. The empirical results show that investors tend to give a negative response to stock prices of listed firms incurring MIDFs. Next, this study divides the firms into different groups based on the soundness of firms’ corporate governance to test whether investors would respond to MIDFs differently because of the difference of corporate governance. The results show that when a board of directors consist of independent directors and the firm has a higher growth rate, investors tend to give higher valuation of stock and reduce their negative of responses. Besides, when the chairman of the board and CEO are same person or when a firm replaces directors, investors tend to give stronger negative valuation. Finally, this study uses the Probit model to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanism on likelihood of firms incurring MIDFs. The results show that the higher ownership of the directors, the overseers of a firm, the higher frequency of attendance of the board’s meeting or the higher return on assets, the lower the probability of a firm to incur an MIDF. On the other hand, the more memberships of board of directors owned by a family or the larger the firm size, the higher the probability of the firm to incur an MIDF.

並列關鍵字

Event study ； Material Information Disclosure Failure (MIDF) ； Corporate governance

參考文獻

王南喻與黃憲彰，2011，探討內線交易醜聞對證券股價之影響-以某上市公司為例，智慧科技與應用統計學報，第九卷，第二期，69-82 。

李瑞妍，2009，產業專家會計師、公司治理與揭露內部控制缺失之關聯，私立中原大學會計系研究所碩士論文。

吳清在、邱正仁與鄭莉，2011，財務危機公司內部治理對會計師簽發繼續經營疑慮意見的影響:台灣上市公司實證之研究，臺大管理論叢，第二十一卷，第二期，187-218。

林穎芬、祝道松與洪晨桓，2006，經濟附加價值與總經理更替之探討，當代會計，第七卷，第一期，103-134。

林有志、黃劭彥、辛宥呈、施志成，2007，我國上市公司半年報申報時間落差特性之研究，當代會計，第八卷，第一期，85-112。