雙重上市企業公司治理與績效表現-以上海、深圳與香港金融市場為例

The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Performance of Cross-listing Companies-Evidence from Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong Markets

林怡廷(I-Ting Lin)

指導教授 ： 陳怡珮 ； 胡為善

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201300249

摘要

全球化的趨勢下，各國金融市場之間互動越趨頻繁，雙重上市(Cross-listing)為企業經常採取的策略，而公司的治理完善與否也是影響公司未來發展的金鑰。學者Stapleton and Subrahmamyam (1977) 發現雙重上市公司的績效影響顯著，此外Coffee (1998)表示外國企業透過雙重上市可以改進其公司治理；此外Black (2001)認為，雙重上市是現代公司治理整合的一項重要工具。企業透過雙重上市以增加更多海外投資人、延伸市場發展觸角與增加公司未來的投資方向。本研究認為雙重上市策略促使企業加強其公司治理制度以因應全球市場規範，因此認為雙重上市企業在公司治理表現應較未雙重上市企業優異。
本研究以港陸雙重上市A+H股與未雙重上市A股(上海及深圳市場上市)分析，資產報酬率(ROA)表示雙重上市公司績效；另外以公司治理變數作為自變數。在研究方法中，第一部分以敘述性統計、差異性檢定以及Pearson相關矩陣判斷變數互相影響強弱。第二部分以OLS、LOGIT迴歸模型檢定及TOBIT受限迴歸模型檢定測試，最後以穩健性測試(Robustness Test)測驗其結果表示本研究組成之迴歸方程式有相當穩健性。本研究將樣本分2003-2004年及2007-2011年作股改前後分析(意即扣除股改2005-2006年期間)。而發現結果與解釋變數之間相關性一致。
研究結果發現公司治理對公司績效呈現顯著正相關；然而雙重上市公司治理績效卻呈顯著負相關。研究其主要原因為國家股持股多造成績效不彰、公司法規範在各市場規範不一。此結果與Licht (2003 and 2004)的發現：「雙重上市公司之主要目的為達成許多優勢目標，但改善顯然不是公司治理其目的之一」以及「雙重上市公司會避免而非與公司治理結合」的結論一致。本研究並發現在股改後，雙重上市公司的績效表現較股改前較佳。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 公司績效 ； 雙重上市 ； A+H股

並列摘要

This study assumes cross-listing strategy is an essential reference to demonstrate the performance of a company’s corporate governances (CG). Investors may realize the growth possibilities of a specific company based on its performance of CG. The advantage of cross-listing companies includes attracting foreign investors, expanding market scale, raising capital, increasing operational developments, strengthening its CG performance and improving company’s operational system. Furthermore, the stock markets developed a CG indicator to measure the impact of CG on a company’s performance. Coffee (2009) and Black (2001) argued that the foreign firms engaged in cross-listing would improve their corporate governance which is known as the “bonding hypothesis”. However, Licht (2003, 2004) argued that the key weakness in the basic bonding theory was that it linked the interests of issuers with those of insiders in decision-making positions. This study attempts to examine whether cross-listing companies improve their corporate governance and whether cross-listing companies outperform non cross-listing companies.
The experimental groups of this investigation, “A+H” stocks are publicly listed in the three markets; while the control group, “A” stocks are only publicly listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. Return on assets representing company’s performance is used as a dependent variable; while CG variables are employed as independent variables. This investigation uses Univariate analysis to distinguish the mutual impacts among variables. This study then employs the OLS, Logit regression and Tobit regression tests to compare the performance of cross-listing companies and that of non cross-listing companies. Finally, Robustness test is used to determine the stability and consistency of all the results.
This study further divides the sample period into two sub-periods as follows: the first sub-period runs from 2003 to 2004, and the second sub-period runs from 2007 to 2011 since there is a stock market’s reformation occurred in China during the period of 2005 to 2006. Empirical results indicate that the relationship among explanatory variables are consistent before and after the stock reformation period. The findings also show that the company’s CG has positively significant relationship with its performance. However, there is a negatively significant relationship between company’s CG and its performances for the cross-listing companies. Licht (2004) also argued that “there is no reason to assume a priori that cross-listing would entail an improvement in issuer’s corporate governance.” The possible explanation of our finding is that there are different market reformations, different legal requirements and different restrictions between stock markets. This result confirms with the findings of Licht (2003 and 2004), Licht (2004) argued that, in reality, cross-listing may be pursued issuers, for a number of good reasons, but corporate governance self-improvement apparently is not among them, issuers may actually be avoiding rather than bonding better governance. This study also finds that cross-listing companies have better performance after stock reformation than before.

並列關鍵字

A+H stocks ； Corporate Governance (CG) ； Company Performance ； Cross-listing.

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