摘 要 公司可能透過非常規之安排,利用關係人交易來進行挪用公司資金與獲利的管道,以致侵害投資人的權益。而在財務報表中關於關係人交易的附註揭露,對投資人而言,是了解該項交易事項的資訊來源。本研究整理樣本公司財務報表附註中對關係人交易所揭露之金額,欲探討關係人交易是否降低盈餘品質,結果發現在合併報表之結果顯示,關係人交易會降低盈餘品質。進一步將關係人交易按交易對象分類為非投資關係之關係人、投資關係但非屬合併報表編製範圍之關係人及聯屬公司間交易,研究分析後得知不論在樣本公司財務報表或是合併財務報表的結果,均顯示與非投資關係之關係人交易會降低盈餘品質。最後探討公司治理機制對於關係人交易與盈餘品質間負向關係的影響,加入公司治理之變數後,實證結果顯示在合併報表的部分有較為顯著之影響。家族成員董事席次對關係人交易降低盈餘品質的幅度有加劇之效果;而與非投資關係之關係人發生交易時,家族成員董事席次會使關係人營業項目降低盈餘品質的幅度更大,而機構法人持股對關係人營業外費用與盈餘品質間的負向關係有減緩的效果。
ABSTRACT Corporations may use related party transactions to engage in expropriating the firm’s resources and to profit from unarm’s-length arrangements that damage investors’ rights. The disclosure about related party transactions in the financial statement is the main resources for investors to learn the transactions. This research investigates whether related party transactions will reduce earnings quality through the analyses about the disclosure of related party transactions in the financial statement. The empirical evidence indicates the related party transactions will impair the earning quality in consolidated financial statement. Furthermore, this research classifies the related party transactions into three categories according to the relationship of the related parties: non-consolidated without investment relationship, non-consolidated with investment relationship, and affiliated companies. The results demonstrate that corporations trading with the related parties with non-consolidated without investment relationship will reduce earnings quality both in financial statement and consolidated financial statement. Finally, the research examines if the corporate governance mechanisms will lessen the negative association between the related party transactions and earning quality. The empirical results show that the higher position family members in the board, the more negative association between the related party transactions and earning quality. And the same effect is observed when corporations trade with the related parties with the non-consolidated without investment relationship. We also find the institution ownership will lessen the negative association between the related party transactions and earning quality.