在企業所有權與經營權分離的情況下,主理人(即股東)與代理人(即經理人)之間存在資訊不對稱,可能產生道德危機。公司為了解決兩者之間的代理問題,常會將經理人的獎酬與公司的股價連結,試圖使兩者的利益一致,意味著公司股價的變動,會同時影響到經理人與股東的財富。在此情況下,經理人便有可能會透過非保守性報導的兩種行為:(1)非保守性財務報導-財務所得上升;(2)非保守性租稅報導-課稅所得下降,使公司的績效表現亮眼,進而影響股價的變化。 本研究以1998年到2007年我國上市公司為樣本,驗證非保守性報導與股東財富之關聯性。本研究主要基於非保守性報導行為是影響企業營運績效之重要因素,而企業營運績效之好壞,往往會影響到該公司股東的股票報酬率,即股東財富,故欲探討當公司有非保守性報導的行為時,是否會對股東財富產生影響,兩者之間是否有關聯。 實證結果發現,非保守性財務報導與股東財富呈現正相關;非保守性租稅報導與股東財富呈現正相關;在不同程度的非保守性財務(租稅)報導下,非保守性租稅(財務)報導對於股東財富的影響有限。
This study investigates whether aggressive reporting affect the shareholder wealth. Because of information asymmetry between the principals and the agents, it is expensive and difficult for the principals to monitor if the agents’ behaviors against the principals’ interest. In order to solve the agency problem, the principals (shareholders) will tie the agents (managers) interest to the principal’s objective and make managers exert on profit maximization. However, such the design of managers’ incentive compensation system may encourage managers’ efforts to engage in aggressive financial (tax) reporting:(1)to make aggressive financial reporting decision to report higher book income to shareholders;(2)to make aggressive tax reporting decision to report lower taxable income to tax authorities. . This paper examines the relationship between aggressive reporting and shareholder wealth in Taiwan Listed Companies from 1998 to 2007. In other words, we examine the implications of aggressive financial and tax reporting for future stock returns. Based on the aggressive reporting is the important factor for the firm’s performance, and the firm’s performance is associated with shareholder wealth. Similar to prior research, we rank firm-years base on our measures of financial and tax reporting aggressiveness and partition our sample into quintiles based on their rank for each year. In the stock returns analyses, we find:(1)the positive relationship between aggressive financial reporting and shareholder wealth;(2)the positive relationship between aggressive tax reporting and shareholder wealth;(3)the limited relationship between firms with different degree of aggressive financial (tax) reporting and shareholder wealth.