- 學位論文
從公司治理角度論我國上市（櫃）公司經營者之薪酬法制
Compensation Regulation of the Listed Companies in Taiwan from the perspective of Corporate Governance
摘要
公司治理中，薪酬管制漸受矚目，而完善之薪酬決定及監控制度更至關重要。我國於2010年增訂證券交易法第14-6條強制推行單軌制產物即薪酬委員會試圖管制薪酬之高幅成長。經本論文自公開資訊觀測站採樣連續虧損但董監事薪酬仍提高之公司，卻較未設置薪酬委員會前提高近兩成，但自100年到105年間，薪酬委員會對薪酬有意見者僅一件，董事會否決薪委會建議者僅九件，顯見立法理由中被視薪酬管制之良方即薪酬委員會並未發生療效。 我國就董監事及經理人之薪酬決定，依公司法第196條係採股東會中心主義，主管機關及法院見解卻認股東會在一定之範圍下得授權董事會自行決定，復經學者實證企業實務上薪酬多授權董事會決定，顯見我國薪酬決定實際係朝向董事會中心主義發展，此將架空公司法第196條且削弱股東之權能，且兩者之法制並不相同。再者，我國公司股權多集中於經營者，其餘多為散戶投資人，且董事長兼任總經理之情形不在少數，若欲採用薪酬委員會進行薪酬管制，則會面臨公司經營、監督及所有三位一體之情形，在薪酬委員需仰賴大股東之提名、得兼任多家公司且薪酬委員會可由非獨立董事者組成等缺陷下，難以期待薪酬受到妥適監控。 此外，公開原則作為證券交易法重要原則之一，我國之薪酬卻係採總額揭露，除主管機關之理由正當性不足外，薪酬之個別揭露不論從股東權之強化、資訊之公開透明或經營者之義務履行之角度均具必要性。本論文並附帶討論薪酬顧問及股東薪酬表意制度（say on pay）於我國之適性。
並列摘要
In series of corporate governance issues, recently it spotlights the executive compensation, and the adequate pay-setting process and supervision are becoming more important. The pay-setting mechanism of directors’ remuneration in our Company Act §196 is shareholder primacy under two-tier system, but the authorities, court decisions and most of the listed companies tended to turn the system into unitary board and the pay-setting process into director primacy, which were two different schemes. In Taiwan, the legislature and the authorities tried to fix the problem of overpaying to executives without connecting to performance by establishing compensation committee. However, this study conducted empirical investigation of the listed companies that raised the compensation with poor performance and found that the situation got worse after they implemented the Securities and Exchange Act §14-6. Furthermore, due to Taiwanese companies’ concentrated ownership, it made the compensation committee in Taiwan was harder to be independent and to be monitored. If the legislature and the authorities insist the compensation committee is the cure of the problem, it should be composed of independent directors under unitary board, with the power of deciding remuneration and taking the responsibility, and the regulation should be simultaneously amended. Last but not least, the disclosure is one of the cores of the Securities and Exchange Act. However, our directors and executive compensation could be reported in aggregate, which is different from the way in U.S., and it might decrease the power of the shareholders, raises concerns over the harm of disclosure and transparency principle and the incapable board to fulfill their duty to monitor. This study would also discuss the possibilities of transplantation of say-on-pay and compensation consultants.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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