近來年涉及財報不實的弊案接連發生,國外有安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(World con)等案,國內則有博達、衛道及力霸等案,其中美國訂立了沙氏法案增強會計師之獨立性,減少會計師與受查公司間之依賴度,保持其超然獨立之精神,藉此降低弊案的發生。反觀我國對增強會計師獨立性之相關法規並無強力的規範,因此本研究專注於尚存於我國會計界之旋轉門現象,探討其對我國會計師審計品質之影響。 本研究以1999年至2009年之上市上櫃公司為觀察樣本,探討存有旋轉門現象公司於準旋轉門現象時期之審計品質是否較其他非旋轉門現象公司低;並進一步探討旋轉門現象公司之準旋轉門時期至旋轉門發生當期的審計品質變化。文中以Modified Jones Model估計之裁決性應計數並加入績效控制來衡量審計品質,並以1配2配對樣本方式,設立具旋轉門現象之實驗組及非旋轉門現象之控制組,使用普通最小平方法(OLS)進行實證。 實證結果顯示,相較於其他非旋轉門公司,旋轉門公司於準旋轉門時期之裁決性應計數顯著較高,可知旋轉門現象對會計師獨立性之影響是從準旋轉門時期(即旋轉門現象發生前期)便受損,致使旋轉門公司之審計品質低於其他公司。
A series of financial reporting frauds have broken out in recent years, like Enron and Worldcom found overseas and Procomp informatics, Welltend Technology and Rebar Group in Taiwan. In the U.S., Sarbanes-Oxley is enacted to strengthen auditor independence and weaken the reliance between auditor and auditee, thereby maintaining the essence of complete independence and decreasing the occurrence of fraud. But in Taiwan, the related laws still are still short of such enforced regulation to improve auditor independence. This paper therefore focuses on the revolving-door phenomenon in our accounting practice to explore its influence on the audit quality. This study observes listed companies from 1999 to 2009 to investigate that while revolving-door firms are still during the quasi-revolving-door period, whether the audit quality is lower than those non-revolving door firms. This study also explores the audit quality variance of revolving-door firms from quasi-revolving-door period to revolving-door transferring year. In this paper, the Modified Jones Model is used to estimate the discretionary accruals and performance control are applied to measure the audit quality. Samples are paired 1- to- 2 to establish the revolving-door experimental group and the non-revolving-door controlled group. Ordinary least squares (OLS) are used for our empirical evidence. The empirical results shows that the revolving-door companies in the Quasi-revolving period are with discretionary accruals significantly higher than those non-revolving-door companies. That is to say, the revolving-door phenomenon impairs the auditor's independence even early in the quasi-revolving-door period, namely in the pre-revolving-door period. That makes the audit quality of revolving door companies to be lower than the other companies.