論公司法中契約自由與法律干預 －以敵意式公開收購為例

Contractual Freedom and Legal Intervention in Company Law: The Desirable Application for Hostile Tender Offer

王家慶(chia-ching wang)

指導教授 ： 朱德芳

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/CYCU.2006.00430

摘要

中文摘要
現代大型股份有限公司涉及利害關係人眾多，如股東、債權人、經營階層、員工，及消費者等等，而此等利害關係人間無可避免地會發生各式各樣的利害衝突。從廣義而言，若未適當地調整此等利害衝突，則將影響著達成公司價值極大化之目標，進而牽動著整個國家社會的福祉。然而學界對於如何調整利害衝突之討論卻著墨不多，於是本文的問題意識便在於討論如何建構一套調整利害衝突以促進公司價值極大化的思考模式。至於如何調整利害衝突以達成效率極大化之目標，本文以為首先應思考當事人可否藉由契約加以調整，倘運作良好的話，則法規範無需過度干預當事人間契約自由所達成之協議安排。然而，契約機制也有其侷限性，例如倘當事人談判地位不平等，則當事人間之契約約定則無法達成效率極大化之安排。此時，即需法規範之干預，以調整當事人雙方的利害衝突。而法規範應否干預的主要考量點之一，便在於使用法規範干預之成本是否會大於利用契約機制等私人解決方式的成本，及兩種調整方式所產生之利益如何。最後本文試著將本文所提出的利害衝突調整之模式應用於公司面臨敵意併購時之特定場景下，試著調整可能發生之利害衝突。因此，根據以上問題意識，本文各章節安排如下：
本文以為建構此一利害衝突調整之模式，加入考量近年來公司法規範理念之變遷，發生了由管制到契約典範移轉，將有助於釐清、合理化利害衝突調整之原則－乃係先契約，後法律干預。從而第二章討論公司法規範理念之變遷。
第三章旨在說明調整利害衝突的思考模式應先思考契約，再思考到法律干預。
第四章討論當契約機制有所侷限性時，法律應如何介入以調整當事人雙方的利害衝突。
第五章旨在討論如何將前兩章所建構之利害衝突調整模式，運用於我國敵意併購相關法律規範之檢討與設計之上，以追求公司價值極大。
最後第六章提出本文的結論。本文再次重申全篇論文所努力細緻化利害衝突調整模式乃係先思考當事人能否藉由契約調整雙方之利害衝突，下一步則是思考法律之干預。

關鍵字

利害衝突 ； 契約自由 ； 敵意式公開收購 ； 法律干預

並列摘要

Abstract
Publicly traded corporations involve so many participants such as shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, customers, and so on. The interests of participants in publicly traded corporations inevitably come into conflict with each other. The conflicts of interest problem in corporations inevitably arise. Although there is an extensive legal literature dealing with conflicts of interest in corporations, no one has attempted to discuss how to reconcile conflicts of interest or explore the fundamental issues in corporate law from the perspective of conflicts of interest. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to offer a framework for reconciling conflicts of interest in corporations. The goal of framework for reconciling the conflicts of interest in corporations is to maximize the value of firm. There are two major mechanisms to resolve conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies. The one is private contract, the other is legal intervention. When reconciling the conflicts of interest in corporations, the first step is to consider that whether private parties are able to reconcile conflicts of interest by contract in advance and the second step is to think how to reconcile conflicts of interest by legal intervention. This is one simple principle the thesis offers when designing legal regime to reconcile the conflicts of interest in corporations. Thus, based on above-mentioned, the discussion of this thesis as follows:
Chapter I of this thesis illustrates the subject of this thesis.
Chapter II of this thesis illustrates that The Company Law has recently undergone a fundamental reform. This reform relates to “from concession to contract” movement. This view regards corporation as nexus-of-contract. Exploring the impact this reform causes may help to shape or clarify the principle of reconciling conflicts of interest.
Chapter III of this thesis presents the principle of reconciling conflicts of interest and examines the limits of contractual freedom in corporate law.
Chapter IV of this thesis explore how to designing legal regime for reconciling conflicts of interest in corporations.
Chapter V of this thesis discusses how to design mechanisms to reconcile conflicts of interest in hostile takeover context based on foregoing discussion.
Chapter VI of this thesis draws the conclusions about the framework for reconciling conflicts of interest.

並列關鍵字

conflicts of interest ； hostile tender offer ； Contractual freedom ； legal intervention

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