搜尋引擎在非價格交易限制之競爭效果法律分析

Legal Analysis on the Competition Effect of Search Engines Under Non-price Restraints

阮韻蒨(Yun-Chien Juan)

指導教授 ： 陳志民

中原大學/法學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201700225

摘要

Google 搜尋引擎透過卓越的演算法則,為使用者提供最相關的搜尋結果頁 面,因而於市場中取得一定的市場地位,並吸引廣告商投資來賺取商業利潤。 惟事業於激烈的競爭中獲得獨占地位或優勢地位後,是否有誘因為限制競爭的 行為,藉由強迫交易相對人接受其單方所制定的非價格交易條件,製造市場進 入障礙以限制競爭對手的發展,將使市場產生封鎖的效果,最終將不利於消費 者。自 2010 年起,Google 在歐美已被競爭主管機關指控有多項的限制競爭的 行為,包含:搜尋歧視-阻礙其他垂直搜尋網站的發展、對廣告商與聯播網的 合作網站為契約上的限制等。

針對競爭對手和歐盟執委會的以上控訴,Google 稱其改變演算法則,將 「垂直搜尋服務」顯示於「一般搜尋服務」的上端,是為了讓使用者有更快、 更好的搜尋體驗,屬於產品的創新整合,並非刻意排擠其他競爭對手與之競爭 的機會,且並沒有直接的證據顯示有垂直搜尋網站因為 Google 的行為而受害。 如同過去在電腦作業系統擁有高度市場力的 Microsoft 公司,利用資訊程式和商業契約的方式,將 Windows 作業系統搭配 Internet Explorer 瀏覽器銷售,藉此 擠壓競爭對手 Netscape 瀏覽器的發展空間般,相同的情節是否又再度發生?

面對競爭激烈、產業變化快速的資訊市場,競爭法該如何評估事業在相關市場的市占率,以及可能帶有限制競爭目的之商業行為,關於此類新型且不斷成長的新興產業,傳統的經濟理論、相關法制與規範又該如何調整,恐怕是未來競爭主管機關所需面對的難題。基於此種理念,本文希望從經濟理論與法規實務,分析搜尋引擎此種具「雙邊市場」特質的事業是否構成相關市場中的獨占地位,協助競爭主管機關規劃適合資訊市場的分析架構;以及該案所可能涉及的限制交易行為之「搭售」、「關鍵設施理論」、「獨家契約」,參酌國外對於此類行為的判斷基準與實務作法,望能提供未來競爭主管機關於未來處理類似案件的具體參考準則,強化事業對競爭法規的可預見性與明確性。

關鍵字

獨占地位 ； 雙邊市場 ； 動態競爭 ； 搜尋歧視 ； 搭售 ； 關鍵設施 ； 獨家交易

並列摘要

The Google search engine uses powerful algorithms to provide users with the most relevant search results possible. Google has thus secured a position in the marketplace and profited by attracting investment from advertising firms. However, after Google succeeded in gaining a monopoly, or dominant position, in the market despite fierce competition, it may have had an incentive to restrict competition by forcing trading partners to accept non-price conditions set forth by them. Such actions create entry barriers to the market that restrict the development of competitors, leading to market foreclosure and, ultimately, hurting the consumer. Since 2010, Google has been accused by competition authorities in Europe and the United States of several instances of anticompetitive practices, including search bias, which hinders the development of other vertical search engines, and Google’s restrictions on AdSense contracts with third party websites (publishers).

In response to these charges by their competitors and the European Commission, Google claims they have changed their algorithms, displaying vertical search services above universal search services to provide users with a faster, more thorough search experience. They claim that this is an innovative, integrative product approach and does not purposely prevent or restrict competition, and that there is no direct evidence of vertical search engines being harmed by their business practices. Similarly, Microsoft, which has considerable market power in computer operating systems, had in the past used computer programs and commercial contracts to market the Windows operating system and the browser Internet Explorer as a package, driving out its web browser competitor, Netscape Navigator. Could similar circumstances arise once more?

In the technology market, where competition is fierce and industries are changing rapidly, competition authorities may face difficult questions in the future. These include how competition law should be used to determine a company’s market share in related industries; how to determine whether commercial practices are restricting competition; whether old economic theories can still be applied to fast-grow- ing, emerging industries; and how related laws and regulations should be modified as a result. Based on these concepts, this paper uses economic theory and regulatory practices to analyze whether search engines, being a two-sided market, hold a monopoly within related industries; aids competition authorities in designing an analytical framework suitable for the technology market; and considers overseas standards and practices regarding restrictive practices related to this case, such as tying, the essential facilities doctrine, and exclusive dealing. This paper hopes to provide competition authorities with concrete standards by which to approach related cases, and to strengthen the predictability and clarity of competition law.

並列關鍵字

Monopoly ； Two-Sided Market ； Dynamic Competition ； Search Bias ； Tying ； The Essential Facilities Doctrine ； Exclusive Dealing

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