會計穩健度與董監自肥公司

Accounting Conservatism: The Perspective of Self-Interested Board of Directors

陳廷堯(Ting-Yao Chen)

指導教授 ： 高儷華

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201400316

摘要

從2008年由美國引發的金融危機開始，讓許多人注意到「即使公司虧損，但公司的高階主管仍然維持高薪、甚至加薪」的肥貓現象。台灣證券交易所也於2011年(民國100年)一月修訂董監自肥名單的揭露標準，從「公司連續2年度稅後虧損惟董監事酬金總額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加」改成「年度稅後虧損惟董監事酬金總額或平均每位董監事酬金卻增加」，標準更加嚴謹。因此本文想要檢測的是，董監自肥公司與非董監自肥公司會計穩健度的差異於修訂揭露標準前後之改變。發現揭露標準改變之後，董監自肥公司使用更不穩健的會計政策，反而是非董監自肥公司使用了更穩健的會計政策，造成修改揭露標準後兩者之間的會計穩健度差異更大。本文結果給予主管機關參考此項修改標準對公司的會計穩健度影響，以提供日後修改標準或法令的方向。

關鍵字

董監自肥公司 ； 肥貓 ； 會計穩健度

並列摘要

After the financial crisis occurred in 2008, the top managers of some net loss companies still get high or higher salary payment. This phenomenon is also known as “fat cat”. Taiwan Stock Exchange has modified the definition of fat cat company from “the company of 2 years’ consecutive net loss with increasing board payment” to “the company of net loss with increasing board payment” since in January, 2011. This paper examines whether the more stringent criteria have any impact of accounting conservatism between the fat cat and non-fat cat companies. The empirical results show that the fat cat companies do not become more conservative as expected, while the non fat cat companies are even more conservative. This indicates that the gap of accounting conservatism between fat cat and non fat companies widens after new policy in 2011.

並列關鍵字

fat cat ； accounting conservatism

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