雙佔市場下之限制性訂價行為

Limit Pricing in Duopoly Market

蔡易利(Yi-Li Tsai)

指導教授 ： 邱顯鴻

國立暨南國際大學/管理學院/經濟學系/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6837/NCNU.2010.00006

摘要

在傳統的訊號傳遞文獻中，在位廠商可以藉由多種方式(如：價格、廣告等)，傳遞訊息給消費者或潛在進入者，吸引消費者購買廠商商品或阻卻潛在進入者進入市場。在獨佔市場的設定下，訊號傳遞的成本會導致廠商的利潤低於完全訊息下之利潤。本文模型假設在寡佔市場下，討論廠商是否可在不完全訊息下做限制性訂價，成功的阻卻潛在進入者，並比在完全訊息下廠商能獲得更大之利潤。其次，再進一步討論滿足分離均衡的充分參數條件，並進一步討論在不同模型的比較。本文發現，在某些條件下，訊號傳遞之廠商所獲得利潤可能會大於完全訊息下之利潤。

關鍵字

訊號傳遞 ； 價格競爭

並列摘要

In the traditional literature on signaling, an incumbent firm may signal its product quality to consumers via a high price or signal its cost to potential entrants via limit pricing. Due to the signaling cost, the incumbent always obtains a lower profit compared to the profit level under complete information. In this paper, we consider a duopoly market in which one of the incumbent firms uses limit pricing to prevent a potential entrant from entering the market. We investigate whether the signaling firm can earn a higher profit than under complete information. Moreover, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions of the separating equilibria in different settings of models. We find that, under certain conditions, the signaling firm may obtain a higher profit than under the complete information.

並列關鍵字

send signal ； price competition

參考文獻

Bagwell, K. and Ramey, G. (1988), “Advertising and Limit Pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 59-71.

Bagwell, K. and Ramey, G. (1991), “Oligopoly Limit Pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics, 22, 155-172.

Bagwell, K. and Ramey, M. H. (1991), “High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality”, American Economic Review, 81, 244-239.

Bontems, P. and Meunier, V. (2006), “Advertising and Price Signaling of Quality in a Duopoly with Endogenous Locations”, forthcoming in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.

Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J. F. (2007), “Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly When There is Universal Private Information”, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.