急推；緩進：回歸前後香港民主路程

論文名稱：急推；緩進：回歸前後香港民主路程校院系：國立暨南國際大學公共行政與政策學系碩班頁數：383 畢業時間：2007/12 學位別：碩士研究生：丘偉國指導教授：翁松燃論文摘要 2007年既是香港回歸中國十週年，也是香港民主長足發展關鍵年。香港行政長官曾蔭權發表《政制發展綠皮書》，要準備落實《基本法》行政長官與立法會終極普選目標，恢復特首協調功能和政府認受性及社會政治回應能力，從而理順長年政治爭議，構建一個「和諧」的香港社會。從羅斯托(Dankwart A. Rustow) 民主轉型論及歷史與結構的觀點，俯瞰香港至今發展歷程，其長年自由港角色，坐擁「面向國際，背靠中國」的中介位置，曾帶動香港經濟持續發展，並於回歸前後賦予中英政經實益。但亦因此，使中英在港政制基本上「維持現狀」未作改進。「九七」議題來臨，香港民主議題隨之湧現，但受「國際化」與「中國化」因素牽扯，過程中各路政治菁英不斷競合，民主化路程因之而呈現不同階段的演化。冷戰時期，香港政制基於冷戰格局及中英各自需求停留在開明殖民體制下「自由而不民主」的狀態。一九八四年中英簽訂關於香港前途的《聯合聲明》，此後英方部署撤退策略，不無「民主抗共」之意。「聯合聲明」簽訂後，香港開展三大民主化階段：一、「光榮撤退」(1992~1997) ；二「推倒重整」(1997~2003) ；三、「循序漸進」(2003~2007) 。期間實質上出現兩波民主化，及一波民主退潮。首先，在「光榮撤退」階段，一九八九年「六四事件」前後，英國決定派出「末代港督」彭定康(Chris Patten)，推動香港民主史上最大幅度改革—「九二政改」方案，要中國接受改革既成事實，容許英國體面地撤離香港。雙方動員政治代理人圍繞民主改革競爭，最後以中方「另起爐灶」終結。一九九七年中國接收香港，步入「推倒重整」階段，特區政府欲落實《基本法》體制，推倒港英「九二政改」的一切民主成果，動員親中及工商保守黨派，從法律、輿論、制度上，壓抑泛民主派及民主發展。特區政府還企圖推動「國家安全條例」立法，全速完成北京屬意的《基本法》部份體制。此際，香港出現首次民主退潮。港人歷經「亞洲金融危機」、多次「人大釋法」、SARS及「國家安全條例」立法，對首任行政長官董建華極為不滿，終引爆二零零三年「七一」大遊行。「七一」前後，泛民主派成功將民主普選轉化為全港共識，促使中國默許特區政府正視雙普選議題。香港開始步入「循序漸進」階段。在香港經濟得CEPA及自由行挹注而強勁復甦之後，新任行政長官曾蔭權提出《第五號報告書》政改方案，展開了香港第二波民主化。其後，曾特首發表《政制發展綠皮書》及其公眾諮詢報告，進行區議會與政治委任制改革，力圖為香港民主及完善《基本法》體制鋪平前路，繼續進行「一國兩制」的「五十年不變」實驗。顯然地，國際社會與中國內部政經變局，一直影響港人政治立場選項，導引香港民主進程。研究發現，就羅氏理論而言：第一，港式民主無法依羅氏理論線性發展，香港回歸民主發生倒退現象。第二，羅氏「背景條件」(Background Condition)的「國民一致性」(Nation Unity)非顯著是香港民主化重要基礎，重點在於宗主國自身政治需要而非香港市民。第三，香港民主還未進入「建制階段」(Habituation Phase)。大致上，香港在一九九一年至二零零三年之間處於「預備階段」(Preparatory Phase)，二零零三年進入「決策階段」(Decision Phase)，但是至二零零七仍不能說已進入「建制階段」，因為內外阻力還是很大限制。

關鍵字

羅斯托民主轉型論、民主化、「一國兩制」、《基本法》、「九二政改」、「七一」大遊行、「雙普選」、《政制發展綠皮書》、「和諧社會」

並列摘要

Title of Thesis: Urgent Push, Slow Progress: Hong Kong’s Democratic Path Before and After the Reversion Name of Institute: Department of Public Policy and Administration Pages: 383 Graduation Time: 12/2007 Degree Conferred: Master of Arts Name of Student: Yau Wai Kwok Advisor Name: Byron S. J. Weng Abstract The Year 2007 marks the tenth anniversary of Hong Kong’s reversion. It is also a pivotal year of Hong Kong’s democratic development. The Chief Executive Donald Tsang issued the “Green Paper on the Development of Political System” which aims to implement “double popular elections,” i.e., the systems of electing the Chief Executive and the Members of the Legislative Council by direct popular votes. Such moves may result in the reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the SAR Government, the recovery of CE’s ability to function as an effective coordinator, and to respond effective to social demands. Political long standing political differences may be brought within manageable level and a Hong Kong “society of harmony” may then be constructed. In terms of Dankwart Rustow’s theory of democratic transition, supplemented with structural and historical analytical point of views, it is to be seen that both Britain and China saw it fit not to change Hong Kong’s political system – an enlightened colonial system that is free but not democratic – for a good long time. This is so because Hong Kong, by virtue of its role as a free port, an intermediary facing the world but backed by China, has experienced long economic growth which also benefited both Britain and China before 1997. Status quo was favored. As 1997 approached, the problem of democratization also emerged in Hong Kong. In this democratization process, through changing stages, various elite groups competed incessantly trying to prevail. But it was not able to free itself from the China element and there was international interference. In 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed and the British Hong Kong government began to prepare for a “glorious retreat.” Hong Kong then went through three stages of development. (1) Glorious Retreat 1991-1997, (2) Destruction and Reconstruction 1997-2003, and (3) Orderly Progress 2003-2007. In terms of democratic transition, there have been two waves of progress and one set back. In 1998, after the “June 4th” Tiananmen Incident, the last British Governor Chris Patten introduced the 1992 Constitutional Reform, by far the most extensive democratization in Hong Kong history, which was partly meant to paved the way for a glorious retreat for Britain. But it ended with China’s decision to “build a separate stove” in 1997. After the reversion, China went ahead to “tear down and rebuild” the Hong Kong government structure in accordance with the Basic Law which prescribed a kind of “bird cage democracy.” Beijing also caused the SAR Government to attempt to enact a National Security Law in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law. This after Hong Kong had just gone through an economic depression, the Asian financial crisis, and the SARS crisis. The inept government of Tung Chee-wah only added to popular discontent. Several “interpretations” of the Basic Law provisions by the Standing Committee of the National People’ s Congress also raised serious objections from the educated Hong Kong public. There was, in fact, a democratic set back during this period. The end shot was a massive demonstration on July 1, 2003 against the Article 23 legislation attempt and the SAR Government was forced to swallow the bitter pill of defeat. The pan-Democratic forces successfully turned the July 1 demonstration into an appeal for the implementation of the “double popular elections.” As this appeal has since become a Hong Kong consensus, Hong Kong’s democratization can be said to have entered the stage of “orderly progress.” Thanks partly to China’s CEPA and “Free Going” tourism policies, Hong Kong economy recovered and has become strong. CE Donald Tsang’s “Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force” commenced the second progressive wave of democratization in Hong Kong. His follow up reports and efforts to reform District Board elections and appointment systems are helping to build a better system within the Basic Law framework. Of course, international elements and China’s developments have also been influencing Hong Kong options as well as her democratic development. By the Rustow scheme, we may say, first, that Hong Kong’ democratic transition has not developed lineally as suggested by his theory, since it had a serious set back. Second, Rustow’s “background” condition, i.e., national unity, was extant, but it was not apparent and was not a key foundation in the Hong Kong case. The reason lies in China rather than in Hong Kong. Third, Hong Kong is not yet in Rustow’s “habituation phase”. Hong Kong was in the “preparatory phase” between 1984 and 2002 and entered the “decision phase” probably in 2003, spearheaded by the CE’s Green Paper on the Development of Political System. But as of 2007, it is still not ready to implement a democratic system in earnest, largely because the forces of resistance, internal and external, are still formidable.