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  • 學位論文

文化多樣性與不完全契約

Cultural Diversity and Incomplete Contract

指導教授 : 吳健瑋

摘要


文化背景不同,可能影響人們決定套牢(hold-up)程度上的差異,進一步影響他人,為避免事後被套牢而於事前投入認知(cognition)的努力程度。本文說明,當來自文化背景的機會主義行為(opportunistic behavior from cultural background)會影響一方決定事後套牢的程度時,也將影響另一方事前所投入的認知水準,從而產生不同程度的契約不完全性與契約效率。異質文化的存在,可能改變既有的認知水準,並藉由跨世代的模仿和其他形式的學習,社會演化將促使交易環境由文化多樣性(cultural diversity)趨於單一性(unity)。若存在地域性(geographic locations)、保護主義(protectionism)、節省成本動機等因素,將提供保持文化多樣性的可能性。透過社會演化的過程,可能促使文化族群比例的消長、整體社會的契約不完全程度及其契約效率的改變。

並列摘要


Diversity of cultural backgrounds is an important factor in hold-up and cognitive problems. This paper shows that the opportunistic behavior from cultural background may affect contract incompleteness and contract efficiency via hold-up and cognition channels. The existence of heterogeneous cultures may change initial cognitive levels. By imitation and social learning within generations, cultural populations will eventually change and all of these makes cultural diversity tend to cultural unity. However, when we consider some factors, such as geographic locations or protectionism, cultural unity is not necessary a unique outcome. Based on adjustment costs, contact may be more or less efficiency after social evolution.

參考文獻


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