透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.221.61.135
  • 學位論文

互補與水平策略聯盟下的價格競爭

Price Competition under Complementary and Parallel Alliance

指導教授 : 邱顯鴻

摘要


一般企業併購中存在垂直併購與水平併購二種型式。市場上存在大部分產品皆須由多種單一元件組成,廠商在不同的併購方式下可以在不同的市場得到相對優勢。廠商可以透過垂直併購,在訂定ㄧ個較低的加總價格或組合價格來壓制對手,也可透過水平併購對於其單一元件市場進行壟斷,來達到利潤極大。本文主要探討產品替代程度及綁售訂價,對於產品價格、廠商利潤以及廠商購併動機的影響。我們首先討論在有綁售訂價與無綁售訂價下之均衡價格,其次比較不同市場架構下的價格及廠商利潤。另外,我們亦探討產品替代程度與市場相對大小對於均衡市場結構的影響。

關鍵字

併購 綁售訂價 市場均衡

並列摘要


There are two major types of business merger: vertical merger and horizontal merger. We consider a market of a composite good that consists of two component goods. Consumers may purchase either the composite good or the component good alone. Firms may choose to either merge vertically or horizontally. In this paper, we examine the effect of product differentiation and bundling price on the incentives for merger. In addition, we also investigate how the product price and the firms’ profit are affected in either the vertical merger or horizontal merger.

並列關鍵字

Merger bundling market equilibrium

參考文獻


參考文獻
Creane, A., and C. Davidson, (2004) “Multidivisional Firms, Internal Competition and the Merger Paradox” Canadian Journal of Economics 37, 951–977.
Choi, Jay P., (2008) “Mergers with Bundling in Complementary Markets,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, vol. 56, issue 3, 553-577
Cournot, Augustin, (1927), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, (N.T. Bacon Trans.), New York: Macmillan. (Original work published 1838).

延伸閱讀