本研究是在探討銀行進入企業董監事會對企業資本結構的影響,進而討論銀行在企業董監事會提供的服務與主要扮演的角色為何。我們的研究利用二階段程序法聯立迴歸模型。主要的實證結果發現:(1)臺灣上市公司有銀行進入企業董監事會將有顯著的長期負債比率上升,代表銀行進入企業董監事會具有提供專業負債認證的服務;(2)在整體及大企業樣本下,放款銀行進入企業董監事會會增加企業長期負債比率,而放款銀行在企業董監事會的存續期間愈長並不會減緩長期負債比率對可供擔保資產比率的敏感度,故放款銀行進入企業董監事會有不盡力的監督行為,且此不盡力的監督行為係來自於先借款再進入企業董監事會的放款銀行所產生;(3)在小企業樣本下,放款銀行進入企業董監事會會促使企業長期負債比率下降,且當放款銀行在企業董監事會的存續期間愈長時,會減緩企業長期負債比率對可供擔保資產比率的敏感度,故放款銀行為小企業會提供了監督功能,且此一監督功能係來自先借款再進入企業董監事會的放款銀行。
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact that bankers on the board are a firm’s debt ratio. Then discussing bankers service that offer on the board and analyze what it will be role that act mainly. Our research is utilized method of two-stage simultaneous estimation procedure. The empirical results show that 1 .bankers on a firm’s board positively and significantly affects the long debt ratio. The results suggest that bankers provide expertise and certification; 2.in total sample and large firm sample, lending bankers also positively and significantly affects the long debt ratio. the longer lending bankers, the more sensitive is its debt ratio to the collateral, raising debt ratio implies that lending bankers are the “disabled monitors” roles. Disabled monitors exist in the sample that enters the firm’s board after financing activity.; 3.in contrast, in small firm sample, lending bankers on a firm’s board negatively affects the debt ratio. the longer lending bankers, the less sensitive is its debt ratio to the collateral. The results suggest that lending bankers exercise a monitoring role for small firm. monitors exist in the sample that enters the firm’s board before financing activity.