達到分析師盈餘預測門檻之盈餘管理行為－以中國上市公司為例

朱家賢(Chu Chia-Hsien)

指導教授 ： 陳慧玲

國立臺灣師範大學/管理學院/管理研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討中國上市公司是否透過盈餘管理以達到分析師盈餘預測或主營業利潤預測，本研究亦檢視達到分析師盈餘預測門檻的中國上市公司，在盈餘發佈日，其累積異常報酬是否較高。此外，本研究檢視當公司僅達到分析師每股盈餘預測或僅達到分析師主營業利潤預測，其累積異常報酬是否有所差異。
　　實證結果顯示，在2007至2009年，中國上市公司利用裁決性應計項目操弄盈餘以增加達到分析師每股盈餘預測均值之機會；然而，中國上市公司利用關係人銷貨及真實交易操弄盈餘以達到分析師每股盈餘預測門檻行為並不顯著，本研究推論中國上市公司可能視裁決性應計項目及真實交易操弄為替代性的盈餘管理方法。除此之外，本研究發現實際盈餘達到或超越分析師每股盈餘預測的上市公司，在盈餘公佈日，其累積異常報酬顯著較高；但相較於僅達到分析師每股盈餘預測卻未達分析師主營業利潤預測之中國上市公司，其累積異常報酬與僅達到分析師主營業利潤預測卻未達分析師每股盈餘預測之中國上市公司並未有顯著差異。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 裁決性應計項目 ； 關係人銷貨 ； 真實交易操弄 ； 累積異常報酬

並列摘要

This study aims to investigate whether Chinese listed firms manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and operating profit forecasts. This study also examines whether the market responds to the meeting or beating of analysts’ expectations. Furthermore, we examine how market reacts when firms meet both earnings forecasts and operating profit forecasts.
　　The empirical results reveal that Chinese listed companies tend to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts during 2007 to 2009. However, the empirical results indicate that companies do not use related-party sales and real transaction manipulations to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. We do not find that Chinese listed firms tend to use earnings management to meet analysts’ operating profit forecasts. In addition, we document that the listed companies which meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts have significantly positive cumulative abnormal return. This study also finds that a significant increase in the market premium to meeting earnings forecasts when the operating profit forecasts is also met. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference in cumulative abnormal return between the company which only meets analysts’ earnings forecasts and the company which only meets analysts’ operating profit forecasts.

並列關鍵字

Earning management ； Discretionary accruals ； Related-party sales ； Real transaction manipulation ； Cumulative abnormal returns

參考文獻

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