團隊成員穩定性作為新產品品質訊號：以好萊塢續集電影的出資決策為例

Member Stability as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Financing Decision of Hollywood’s Sequel Movies

黃振軒(Chen-Hsuan Huang)

指導教授 ： 王仕茹

國立臺灣師範大學/教育學院/大眾傳播研究所/碩士(2007年)

摘要

電影為根據享樂價值進行判斷的「經驗性產品」，在沒有觀看過電影前很難加以評估內容品質，而買家在進行這類產品的消費行為前，通常會根據產品或產品銷售者等相關可獲得的現有資訊，尋求判定新產品內容品質的參考訊號，藉以降低新產品的風險性與不確定性。特別是電影製作公司在電影開拍前就必須進行出資決策的情形下，電影團隊成員被視為電影品質訊號傳遞的重要資源。

本研究的目的為探究電影製作公司在電影開拍前，可能影響進行出資決策的關鍵性因素。研究者針對影響電影內容製作品質的代表性製作團隊成員進一步分析，由於具有高票房成績與知名聲譽的電影製作團隊成員重視自己過去培養的聲譽，並且他們擁有的票房保證與過去培養支持該成員的消費者，使得電影製作公司相信能藉由這些團隊成員降低製作電影的高度風險性與不確定性，特別是續集電影都擁有較佳票房成績的前集電影。

因此，當續集電影與前集電影的電影製作團隊成員一致性愈高時，電影製作公司認定電影製作的風險性與不確定性愈低，則出資前集電影製作的製作公司與投資者則愈傾向繼續出資續集電影的製作，不願意退出可能產生高獲利的電影出資。換言之，當續集電影與前集電影的電影製作團隊成員一致性愈高時，則續集電影的資金結構應愈傾向穩定。

經實證分析結果發現，當電影製作公司在進行續集電影的出資決策時，會根據續集與前集電影的演員、製片一致性，決定是否持續投資續集電影的製作與拍攝的出資決策，亦即當演員與製片的一致性愈高時，則續集電影的資金結構穩定性也就愈高。另一方面，當續集與前集電影明星一致性愈高時，則電影製作公司愈傾向不持續投資續集電影的製作與拍攝，造成資金結構變動性愈高。

關鍵字

續集電影 ； 訊號傳遞 ； 團隊成員 ； 出資決策 ； 穩定性

並列摘要

Movie industry is an example of a typical “experience product” market. The pre-consumption quality of such a product is difficult to assess without actually viewing the movie. In distinguishing between sellers of high- and low-quality products before consumption, consumers in such markets look for credible information about products and sellers that firms can provide using “signals” to assess the new product quality. It also can mitigate consumers to exposure to risk and uncertainty. Especially for motion picture industry, nearly all financing decisions are made before films are produced. Thus, team members in the film production are the important sources to be signals to assess the film quality.

We investigate what factors are influenced in making financing decision and take key roles in Hollywood filmmaking as signals. In particular, we focus on the effect of member stability between sequel and original movie. Members’ reputation and box -office success derived from past observation are important in contexts characterized by imperfect information, in which studio and production can rely on proxies or signals to make rational assumption about the intention and future behaviors of members. From the consideration, we develop five hypotheses arguing that the positive relation between stabilities of significant roles in filmmaking and motion picture finances.

We use data on 128 sequels presented in America in the period 2002-2007 for our empirical analysis. The results are that producer and actor stabilities between sequel and original movie have positive relation to finances. But it is negative relation between movie star stability and film finances.

並列關鍵字

Sequels ； Signaling ； Team Members ； Financing Decision ； Stability

參考文獻

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