伊朗核政策分析：新古典現實主義理論的觀點

伊朗之重要性在於：中東地區什葉派領導國家，擁有天然氣與石油資源，扼控波斯灣之世界海上運輸要道。鑒於伊朗1979年爆發革命後，長期挑戰美國主導之中東政治秩序，加上伊朗以發展核能之名推行核計畫，爆發可能具有軍事用途之核武爭議，因而遭到美歐及聯合國制裁，引起伊朗軍方威脅封鎖波斯灣之報復行動等，致使伊朗核問題成為全球兩大核武熱點議題之一。因此，本文問題意識：第一，伊朗核計畫與核政策引發爭端原因為何？第二，伊朗核政策與其他國家之交互影響與結果為何？第三，伊朗有無製造核武之分析與發展為何？本文研究發現：其一，不論是國際或非國際層次，皆對於伊朗的核政策具有一定的影響力，現實主義理論各學派中，以新古典現實主義對於伊朗核政策最具解釋力，該學派先從國際層次探討，指出伊朗伊斯蘭教什葉派政權深具反美意識形態，復因伊朗發展核計畫及對區域之宗教、政治介入，長期面臨美國之政、經壓力，自然將美國視為伊朗最大之國家安全威脅來源，因而，如何應對美國在國際體系上壓力，是伊朗決策者最重要課題。其二，在非國際層次方面，國家、個人層次之四個中介變項中，以領導者對美國政策之認知，最能直接影響伊朗核政策之形成，最高領袖雖重視保守派戰略文化，卻同時保持政策彈性，另外革命衛隊之因素是伊朗核政策中最特別之中介變項，在所有政府機構中，是唯一具有擬定、執行自身政策能力之變項，因而能相當程度影響羅哈尼政府之核政策。整體而言，就伊朗政府有無製造核武之分析與發展之問題，以內賈德政府時期對國際環境抱持高度不安全感、堅信美國及其盟友以色列意圖顛覆伊朗，以及內賈德重用革命衛隊之立場，佐以內賈德不計一切代價發展濃縮鈾科技等的事實，可以發現內賈德政府最具有發展核武力量之意圖。羅哈尼政府上台後，鑒於美歐制裁衝擊經濟，伊朗強硬保守派擁核圖謀暫時受到壓制，然實際上仍盼保留核計畫，掌握濃縮鈾技術成果；目前羅哈尼政府雖仍以核子協議為重，且未明顯遭到最高領袖哈米尼之疏遠，然而，強硬保守派的勢力已因美國川普政府退出協議而壯大，革命衛隊更已適應國際制裁，以致立場趨於強硬，強硬保守派能否再受到抑制，成為未來伊朗核議題之重要變數。基此，本文研究建議：其一，鑒於美國拜登甫於2月上台，伊朗則將於今年6月舉行總統大選，而伊朗國內強硬保守派勢力上升，故拜登如欲在羅哈尼下台前在核問題上取得進展，時間較為急迫，因而必須關注美國會否加強與歐盟、俄國、中國互動，以避免伊朗核問題惡化之趨勢。其二，伊朗最高領袖年事已高，健康狀況不佳，尚未任命其繼任人選，故伊朗總統大選前可能參選人之政見、是否獲得哈米尼支持等，將是未來值得關注之重點。其三，未來一旦伊朗決定重新加入核子協議，羅哈尼政府將如何補償或滿足革命衛隊之損失與利益，方能說服革命衛隊配合羅哈尼政府，重新回到核子協議，將是觀察革命衛隊會否破壞伊朗重新加入核子協議之重要指標。

關鍵字

伊朗；現實主義；核政策；中東；伊斯蘭

並列摘要

The importance of Iran lies in its leadership of Shia faction in the Middle East. With abundant oil and gas natural resources, Iran controls the Persian Gulf which is a significant world maritime transport route. Given that Iran has been posing a major challenge for the order of Middle East under US’s leadership after its 1979 revolution. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program which in the name of energy development incites the continuing nuclear weapon controversy over its possible military dimensions, and Iran therefore has long been under sanctions from US, EU and UN. To counter the economic sanctions, Iran’s revolutionary guard threatens the closure of Persian Gulf as a revenge against US. The Iranian nuclear disputer has become one of the world’s hotspot issues. Thus, this thesis answers the following questions: Firstly, what is the reason for the Iranian nuclear program and policy? Secondly, What are the interactive effects and results of Iran’s nuclear policies with other countries? Thirdly, what is the analysis and development of whether nuclear weapons are manufactured in Iran? The findings are as follows. Firstly, regardless of the international or non-international level, they both have a certain influence on Iran’s nuclear policies. Among the various schools of realism theory, neoclassical realism is the most explanatory for Iran’s nuclear policies. Starting with the international level, neoclassical realism indicates that Iranian Islamic Shia regime is deeply anti-American ideology. In addition, Iran has long been suffering US’s political and economic pressure in that Iran develops a controversial nuclear program and interfere with regional countries at religious and political dimensions. Therefore, how to counter the US pressure in the international system is the top priority of Iran’s leadership. Secondly, regarding the non- the international level, neoclassical realism indicates that among the four intervening variables at the national and individual levels, the perception of Iran’s leadership of US policy is the variable which affects the formation of Iran’s nuclear policy. Although the supreme leader pays attention to the conservative strategic culture, he maintains the policy resilience as well. Besides, the factor of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps is the most special intervening variable. Among all the government sectors, IRGC is the only institution that owns the ability to form and fulfill its policy. Thus, IRGC can affect President Rouhani’s government nuclear policy to some extent. In sum, when we look into the issue of whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons from a theoretical point of view by applying realism theory. Iran held a high degree of insecurity about the international environment during the period of President Ahmadinejad’s government. That government firmly believed that the US or its ally Israel intend to overthrow Iran regime. That President Ahmadinejad promoted IRGC officials and the fact that he developed enrichment technology at all expense indicate that, President Ahmadinejad government has the most intent to development nuclear weapons. After President Rouhani took power, given that the US and EU economic sanctions impact Iran’s economy, the nuclear ambition and intent of Iran’s conservative hardliners is suppressed. However, the hardliners insist in keeping the nuclear program and controlling the enrichment technology achievement. At present President Rouhani’s government still pays attention to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although President Rouhani still enjoy close relation with the supreme leader, the power of conservative hardliners has already grown due to US President Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA. Above all, IRGC has been more adapted the US economic sanctions and its position become more assertive. Whether Iran’s conservative hardliners can be suppressed has become an important variable for the prospect of the Iranian nuclear issue. Three suggestions emanating from my research are: firstly, given that US President Biden’s government has just come to power in February and Iran is about to have a presidential election in June this year. With the rise of Iran conservative faction, President Biden has a shorter time if US intend to make progress in the Iranian nuclear issue before Iran President Rouhani step down. Thus, to prevent the worsening of Iranian nuclear issue, whether US would intensify engagements with EU, Russia and China, is worth attention. Secondly, the Iran supreme leader is old and has health problems. He has not yet appointed the successor. Therefore, continuing to observe the potential presidential candidates, its political views and whoever is supported by the supreme leader, is suggested. At last, once Iran President Rouhani’s government decides to rejoin the JCPOA, in which way that President Rouhani can compensate or satisfy the loss and interest of IRGC, then the President could convince IRGC to cooperate fully with his government. Whether IRGC will interfere with President Rouhani’s effort to rejoin the JCPOA or not, is an important index as well.