The ownership structure of family firms is different from that of non-family firms. Family members serve as board of directors at many family firms. Compared to non-family firms, family firms face more severe Type II agency problems. Type II problems may affect firms’ decisions to avoid taxes, which may affect the tax revenue of the government. The objective of this study is to examine whether the separation between control rights and cash flows rights affect the extent of tax avoidance. This paper also investigates to what extent of tax avoidance is affected by the pressure of succession and board interlocking. The sample of this study is family firms listed in Shenzhen Stock Market and Shanghai Stock Market from 2010 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that the separation between control rights and cash flows right has no significant impact on the extent of tax avoidance. The results also indicate that the pressure of succession and board interlocking have no significant impact on the extent of tax avoidance.