公司治理與股權結構對公司經營績效之影響

The Effect of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure On Corporate Operating Performance

許美玲(Hsu Mei-Lin)

指導教授 ： 蔡蒔銓

國立臺灣師範大學/管理學院/高階經理人企業管理碩士在職專班(EMBA)/碩士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6345/NTNU202200567

摘要

本研究資料期間以西元2014 年至西元 2019 年共計六年期，樣本資料擷取經濟新報資料庫全台灣「上市公司」之公司治理評鑑評等結果作為研究主體，自2014年施行公司治理評鑑以來，探討公司治理對公司經營績效之影響，研究發現公司治理對公司經營績效呈正向顯著之影響，進一步從公司不同的股權結構進行分析，發現對於外部法人持股高之公司以及對於經理人持股高之公司，其正向影響皆更為顯著。
實證結果顯示，當公司治理較好的公司，代表越能強化監督功能，減低代理成本，更能顯著提高公司的經營績效。尤其法人具有專業的知識與高效能監督的能力，配合完善的公司治理機制下，法人持股高更能確實監控公司的營運，提高營運績效，而其經理人持股高會產生與股東所追求最大利益目標一致，配合完善的公司治理機制，可預防經理人持股高產生濫權，防範圖謀私利，促使經理人可積極管理公司提升營運績效。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 公司治理評鑑 ； 股權結構 ； 公司經營績效

並列摘要

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the company's operating performance since the corporate governance assessments has been implemented in 2014. Using the result of corporate governance assessments of listed companies in Taiwan, collected by the Taiwan Economic Journal from 2014 to 2019, this study finds that corporate governance has a positive and significant impact on the company's operating performance. Further analysis of the company's different shareholding structures shows that the positive impact is more significant for companies with a higher shareholding ratio of external juridical persons and for companies with a higher shareholding ratio of managers.
The empirical results show that when a company has better corporate governance, it is more likely to strengthen the supervisory function, reduce the agency cost, and significantly improve the company's operating performance. In particular, the juridical person has professional knowledge and the ability to supervise the company efficiently. Cooperating with the perfect corporate governance mechanism, companies with a higher shareholding ratio of juridical persons are more likely to truly monitor the company's operations and improve its operational performance. On the other hand, companies with a higher shareholding ratio of managers are more likely to pursue the same goal with shareholders. With the corporate governance mechanism, those companies can prevent managers from abusing their power due to high shareholding, prevent self-seeking, and encourage managers to actively manage the company to improve operational performance.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； corporate governance assessments ； shareholding structure ； company operating performance

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