經理人異動對實質盈餘管理之影響

The Effect of Real Activities Manipulation on CEO Turnover

賴玫帆(Mei-Fan Lai)

指導教授 ： 薛敏正

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

本研究探討不同的經理人異動類型對實質盈餘管理之影響。以1998年至2011年間台灣的上市櫃公司為樣本，本研究實證研究發現，當經理人為強迫性異動且係遭撤換時，會誘使經理人從事實質盈餘管理。可能原因為實質盈餘管理不易被內部或外部監督人員，例如會計師或董事會察覺，在短視近利的前提下，經理人亦不會關注實質盈餘管理對未來企業的價值的影響，因此從事實質盈餘管理的動機便會增加。

關鍵字

經理人異動 ； 實質盈餘管理 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

This study is to examine how CEO turnover induced by different reasons of the dismissal affect real earnings management. Using a sample of Taiwanese publicly traded companies over the period of 1998-2011, we find evidence suggesting that managers who are forced out and dismissal are more likely to excise real earnings management. This result is probably due to preventing from drawing auditor or regulatory scrutiny and manager’s myopic behavior. As the result, managers are more likely to excise real earnings management to increase short-term earnings.

並列關鍵字

Real activities manipulation ； CEO turnover ； Agency problem

參考文獻

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