經費指定與否下之競租社會浪費

The Rent-seeking Social Cost of The Funding Specified or Not

林敬昀(Ching-Yun Lin)

指導教授 ： 翁仁甫

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

由於政府所提供的經費並不完全用於指定項目下，因此可能產生競租活動，又傳統公共選擇學派大多認為競租活動最終一定會產生社會浪費，故鑒於目前既有文獻尚未有對於不同階段的經費指定與否產生的社會浪費做比較。

　　本文擬參考Katz et al.（1990）之標的為純公共財之單階段競租模型，將競租賽局擴展為多階段，並針對單階段與多階段競租賽局所產生的結果，相互比較來瞭解經費在不同的指定形式下，所產生的社會浪費之差異。

　　綜合言之，本文的目的是在探討經費的指定與否以及先後決定的競租活動所造成的浪費程度，而後可以得出：在某些假設成立下，將經費指定用途並不必然使競租浪費下降之結論。

關鍵字

競租 ； 指定 ； 社會浪費

並列摘要

There will be rent-seeking activities if the usage of government providing fund is not always specified. According to the views of school of public choice, rent-seeking activities will ultimately generate social cost. However, there is no published literature to demonstrate whether there will be social cost under different level of funding specified.

　　The thesis took the paper “Rent-seeking for pure public goods” published by Katz, E., S. Nitzan and J. Rosenberg (1990) as reference, and extended the rent-seeking game model to multi-stages to compare the outcomes of single and multi-stages settings and get further understanding of social cost they caused. And through the studies, under some assumptions, the funds with predetermined purpose would not absolutely reduce the waste of social resources.

並列關鍵字

rent-seeking ； specified ； social cost

參考文獻

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Baik, K. H. and J. F. Shogren (1995). Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests, Public Choice, 83: 113-126.

Bhagwati, J. N. (1982). Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking（DUP）Activities, Jorunal of Political Economy, 90: 988-1002.

Buchanan, J. (1963). The economics of earmarked taxes, The Journal of Political Economy, 71: 457-469.

Buchanan J. (1980), Rent seeking and profit seeking, Toward a Theory of the rent-seeking society.