私募資訊強化揭露後之資訊內涵探討

The Information Contents of Disclosure Enhancement Effects for Private Placement

姜振富(Chen-Fu Chiang)

指導教授 ： 張仲岳

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

民國94年10月11日金管會發布「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」後，增加許多上市櫃公司辦理私募有價證券資訊公開的強制規定，除了原有的股款或價款繳納完成後十五日內之相關資訊揭露外，另規定公司於寄發股東會開會通知日起二日內，及私募定價日起兩日內，須將私募相關資訊揭露，這些資訊讓股東及潛在投資者較過去更有系統且更及時得到私募之相關資訊，且「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」實施之後，私募案件非但沒有減少，反而成為上市櫃公司募資之主流。
本研究探討在私募新辦法實施後，在董事會決議日、股東會通過日、私募定價日及繳納完成申報日之四個不同私募宣告時點，是否會產生不同之異常報酬反應，且分析可能影響私募宣告累積異常報酬之因素與累積異常報酬間之關係。
研究結果顯示在四個私募宣告日之平均異常報酬皆為正向，惟在董事會決議日及股東會通過日時，正向平均異常報酬在事件期間大多不顯著，而在私募定價日及繳納完成申報日時有顯著正向之異常報酬；而由於定價資訊須充分揭露，其折價效果對異常報酬之影響已不顯著；在監督效果方面，私募所帶來之監督效果在繳納完成申報日則較為顯著；而研究結果亦顯示私募可解決資訊不對稱之問題；另研究結果發現內部人之自利行為雖存在但不明顯；而私募目的若含有投資機會、或解決財務困境、或涉及經營權變更，都會產生正向之異常報酬。

關鍵字

私募 ； 私募股權 ； 事件研究 ； 累積異常報酬

並列摘要

The “Private Equity Regulation” announced by Financial Supervisory Commission on October 11, 2005, provides further scrutiny on private equity firms for greater transparency, in which that private equity information must be disclosed within 15 days of payment of stock subscription, within 2 days following publication of the notice of shareholders’ meeting, and within 2 days of fixed private placement price. This will allow shareholders and potential investors to be more efficiently informed of the performance data. After the regulations were promulgated, there were even more investments in private equity, and more operating companies used this way to raised capital.
This study focuses on the market reaction to four equity issue announcements: the days after the implementation of new equity regulations, the board meeting announcement, the shareholders’ meeting announcement, closing date of private placement and reporting day. We then analyze the impact and relationship between these announcements and the cumulative abnormal return.
The result showed positive average abnormal return on all four announcement dates, however, the relationship were less significant on the board meeting and the shareholders’ meeting announcements, and were significantly high on private placement announcement and reporting day. The discount-weighted strategy has a lesser impact on abnormal return due to price disclosure, and the monitoring mechanism brought by private placement were more significant on reporting day. We have found that firms using private placements could avoid asymmetric information, and managerial self-interested behavior was not significant. Abnormal return is positive when the objectives of private offerings include investment opportunities, resolving financial issues or change in managerial control.

並列關鍵字

Private Placement ； Private Equity ； Event Study ； Cumulative Abnormal Return

參考文獻

2.李協昌，2006年，「上市公司私募股權之資訊內涵及折價因素之探討」，國立台灣大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。

3.施俊廷，2006年，「公司減資宣告與增資私募對股價影響之比較研究」，國立成功大學高階管理碩士在職專班碩士論文。

5.陳振智，2007年，「私募股權之異常報酬探討」，國立台灣大學管理學院國際企業研究所碩士論文。

1.Hertzel, M., M. Lemmon, J. Linck, and L. Rees. 2002. Long-term Performance Following Private Placements of Equity. Journal of Finance 57, 2595-2617.

2.Herzel, M., and R. L. Smith. 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for pricing equity privately. Journal of Finance 48（6）, 458-485.