擴大書審制度下稽徵機關與納稅人間決策之賽局模型分析

Game Theoretic Analyses of Tax Bureau and Taxpayers' Decision under the “Expanded Paper Review of Business Income Tax Direction" in Taiwan.

胡瑞璽(JUI-SHI HU)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本研究由賽局理論模型分析現行擴大書審制度下稽徵機關與納稅人之最佳策略選擇，以及稽徵成本、同業利潤標準及擴大書審純益率變動對均衡之影響，本研究之主要結論為：
一、在一般情況下，稽徵機關與納稅人間存在之均衡為：部分的納稅人誠實申報，部分的納稅人不實申報，而稽徵機關對部分的申報案件書面審核，對部分的申報案件選案查核。
二、降低稽徵成本有助於減少納稅人不實申報之比率，但不會影響稽徵機關的最適抽查率，稽徵機關應致力於簡化稽徵程序、提高選案正確性等方式降低稽徵成本。
三、同業利潤標準的提高可同時降低納稅人不實申報比率及稽徵機關的最適抽查率，但因實務上使用同業利潤標準之原因眾多，故不宜設定於過嚴苛之水準。
四、擴大書審純益率的提高會導致納稅人不實申報之比率提高，但對稽徵機關的最適抽查率影響則不明確。

關鍵字

擴大書審 ； 逃漏稅 ； 不實申報 ； 同業利潤標準 ； 賽局模型

並列摘要

In this study, we use a game theoretical model to analyze the equilibrium between tax bureau and taxpayer, and the effects of Audit cost, Business net profit margin and Expanded Paper Review of Business net profit margin change.
The main conclusions are:
1.Generally, some taxpayers underreport their profit margin, and some taxpayers are audited under the “Expanded Paper Review of Business Income Tax Direction” in equilibrium.
2.While decrease in audit costs results in decrease in taxpayers’ noncompliance, it has no effect on the probability of tax bureau’s audit. Tax bureau should devote to simplify taxation procedure, and improve audit accuracy to reduce the audit cost.
3.Although increase in “Business net profit margin” leads to decrease in both taxpayers’ noncompliance and the probability of tax bureau’s audit, these standard net profit margin are widely used in other tax practice. Thus standards should be set at a reasonable level.
4.Increase in “Expanded Paper Review of Business net profit margin” brings about increase in taxpayers’ noncompliance, its effect on the probability of tax bureau’s audit is not clear.

並列關鍵字

Expanded Paper Review of Business Income Tax Direction ； Tax Evasion ； Tax noncompliance ； Business net profit margin ； Game Theory

參考文獻

7.陳明進(2006)「稽徵機關稅務查核對營利事業短漏報所得之影響」，《經濟論文，中央研究院經濟研究所》，34:2,213-250。

1.Allingham, M.G., and A. Sandomo, 1972. “Income Tax Evasion:A Theoretical Analysis,” Vol 1, Journal of Public Economics, pp.323-338.

2.Graetz, M., J. Reinganum, and L. Wilde, 1986. ”The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement.”Journal of Law, Economics. & Organization, Vol 2, No.1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 1-32

中文部分：

1.朱敬一(1988)「台灣營利事業所得稅逃漏的成因與指標-MIMIC模型的應用」，《經濟論文叢刊》，16,481-489。