在風險性與模糊性中的投標行為

Bidding Behavior for Risky and Ambiguous Prospects

徐振傑(Chen-Chieh Hsu)

指導教授 ： 鍾麗英

國立臺北大學/商學院/統計學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

本研究延伸了Kocher and Trautmann(2013)對於風險性和模糊性投標行為的研究。藉由問卷調查法來蒐集每位受試者的風險偏好程度，區分出較為風險追求以及較為風險規避的受試群體。

實驗中進行四種不同型式的拍賣遊戲來觀察受試者在風險性與模糊性中的投標行為。遊戲一和二為單標拍賣，遊戲一為第一價格拍賣(FPA)：下注金額最高者得標，並且支付自己的投標金額；遊戲二為次價格拍賣(SPA)：下注金額最高者得標，並且支付第二高的投標金額。遊戲三和四為複標拍賣，提供兩單位的拍賣標的，遊戲三為歧視性拍賣(DPA)：下注金額前兩高者得標，並且支付各自的投標金額；遊戲四為均一性拍賣(UPA)：下注金額前兩高者得標，並且均支付第三高的投標金額。遊戲採用Ellsberg(1961)的兩色選擇來做為代表風險性與模糊性的情況。

研究結果主要呈現出四個結論：(1)大部分受試者傾向於風險性的選擇，在模糊性的選擇中人數較少。(2)對於模糊性的獲利機會抱持的正向態度的受試者較少，而極端負面的態度也出現不多。(3)在模糊性的選擇中大部分為相對較具有風險忍受程度的受試者。(4)平均下注金額在風險性與模糊性中的差異不大，但模糊性的選擇中受試者較少。

關鍵字

實驗 ； 拍賣 ； 風險性 ； 模糊性 ； 風險規避

並列摘要

This study extends the research of Kocher and Trautmann (2013) for risky　and ambiguous bidding behavior. Survey techniques were used to collect　subjects’ biding behavior under different auction rules, distinguished more　risk-averse and less risk-averse groups, and different risk preferences of subjects.

Four different types of games are used to measure subjects’ biding behavior　towards a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Game 1 is a first-price auction. Game 2 is a second-price auction. Game 3 is a discriminatory-price auction .Game 4 is a uniform-price auction, the two winners pay the highest rejected bids. Two-color choice task by Ellsberg(1961), representing the situation of risky and ambiguous prospects was used in this study.

There are four main findings: (1) Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to smaller markets for the ambiguous prospect. (2) Few people have a positive attitude towards ambiguous according to the question about winning chances, extremely negative attitudes are also rare for bidders in both auctions. (3) The ambiguous prospect was consist of relatively risk tolerant bidders. (4) Average bids for both risky and ambiguous prospects were similar even though the size of ambiguous prospect is smaller.

並列關鍵字

Experiment ； Auction ； Risky ； Ambiguous ； Risk aversion

參考文獻

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