管制政策的分配政治特質：我國環境保護訴願決定的實證分析，1993~2007年

The Distributive Attributes of Regulatory Policy：An Empirical Analysis on Administrative Appeals of Environmental Protection from 1993 to 2007, Taiwan.

郭益玟(Yi-Wen Kuo)

指導教授 ： 羅清俊

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

本論文以分配政策理論為基礎，觀察立法委員選舉在複數選區單記非讓渡投票制度下（第二屆至第六屆立法院期間），立法委員選區內提出環保訴願的民營企業所獲得的訴願決定是否受到立法委員的政治力影響。由於複數選區單記非讓渡投票制度下的立法委員同時面對眾多競爭者，因此他們會藉由積極建立和經營個人票倉區以獲得過門檻的票數來維持競爭優勢。所以，本論文特別關心提出環保訴願的企業是否會因為座落地點位於立法委員的票倉區內而獲得有利的訴願決定。基於此，作者利用邏輯斯迴歸分析觀察提出環保訴願的企業所獲得的訴願決定是否會受到立法委員所面對的選舉制度性誘因、立法委員在國會中所擁有的制度性權力因素以及其個人動機誘因等因素的影響而有所差異。
本論文發現，首先，立法委員確實會藉由職權影響環保管制政策，使座落於其票倉區內有汙染事實的企業獲得有利的訴願決定，因而使得管制政策成為立法委員討好企業的肉桶工具。換言之，管制政策呈現出分配政治的特質。其次，座落於立法委員票倉區內提出環保訴願的企業獲得撤銷裁決的機會顯著高於非座落於立法委員票倉區內的企業。再者，票倉區規模也是影響訴願決定的主要因素，呈現出座落於票倉區立委員額數為一位的訴願企業獲得訴願撤銷的機會遠高於座落於兩位及兩位以上立委所共有票倉區內的企業之現象。由此可知，複數選區單記非讓渡投票制度確實會促使立法委員特別關注其票倉區內的選民，而關注的程度則與票倉區規模成反向關係。除此之外，沒有個人票倉區的立法委員和有個人票倉區的立法委員影響環保訴願決定所憑藉的國會制度性因素和個人動機因素呈現出不同的特性，主要是在執政黨籍立法委員的比例、立法委員的企業背景、提出訴願企業的存續時間以及員工數等因素方面。最後，提出環保訴願的企業除了向以企業座落地為票倉區的立法委員尋求協助之外，也同時會尋求同一個選區內其它立法委員的協助，藉由兩者的政治影響力獲致有利於他們的訴願結果。
本研究不僅證實了管制政策確實具有分配政治的特質，也證實了複數選區單記非讓渡投票制度下的票倉區現象確實存在並且是影響立法委員肉桶行為的主要因素。本文的研究發現可以提供分配政治研究在複數選區單記非讓渡投票制度下的實證基礎。

關鍵字

管制政策的分配政治特質 ； 分配政治 ； 複數選區單記非讓渡投票制 ； 票倉區 ； 環保訴願 ； 環境保護政策

並列摘要

This thesis explores the political influences of legislators on the administration appeals filed by corporation located in legislators’ districts. Under the characteristics of the SNTV system, legislators tend to take care of sub-district constituencies where loyal votes are cluster to them. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on how location differences of appealing companies attract different extent of legislators’ attention. The author hypothesized that appealing companies located in the legislator’s supporting areas where votes are concentrated for them, tend to receive better results of administration appeal than appealing companies which are outside legislators’ cores. Logistic regression is employed to estimate the factors that would affect the results of appeals such as the characteristics of legislative electoral system, the institutional power of legislators, and legislator’s motives.
The statistical findings are shown that, first of all, legislators do help the appealing company located in their supporting areas getting better appealing results, in the sense that legislator treats regulatory policy as the pork barrel to please the company. Second, if only one legislator dominates the sub-district (vote-concentrated area) where the company located, then the appealing result is better than other appealing companies whose location without legislators’ dominance or with more than one’s dominance. Obviously, the characteristics of the SNTV system spur legislators paying more attention to their vote-concentrated areas, and the intensity of attention decreases as the number of legislators who dominate the same sub-district increases. Third, there are some significant factors contributing to the appealing results such as the proportion of legislator with ruling party membership, business background of legislators, operation duration and the amount of workers of appealing company etc.. Fourth, the appealing companies will look for helps both from legislators in district and the legislator(s) whose votes concentrated in the sub-district where the appealing company located to get better administration appeal results.
In sum, this thesis not only proves that the regulatory policy has distributive attributes, but also confirm that the pork-barrel behavior of legislators mostly affected by the sub-district where their vote are concentrated. These findings have some implications on distributive politics under the SNTV system in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

Distributive Politics ； Distributive Theory ； SNTV ； Environmental Protection Policy ； Legislative Yuan

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