企業併購法第六條獨立專家相關問題之研析

Research on the Issues of Independent Experts in Article 6 of Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act

陳楷仁(Kai-Jen Chen)

指導教授 ： 張心悌

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

我國併購法制中，為了確保併購對價公平以保障股東權益，於2002年制定的企業併購法中第6條設有獨立專家制度，強制要求公開發行公司併購時委請獨立專家對於併購對價進行檢查並出具意見。然而，在幾乎每項併購案併購對價之公平性均有獨立專家背書下，股東對於併購對價不公的質疑聲浪仍層出不窮。考其原因，本文認為獨立專家意見之所以不被信任係因我國法制中對於獨立專家制度之設計過於簡陋，僅要求企業於併購時須委請獨立專家，而對於獨立專家獨立性、專業性之確保、出具意見時評價方法選用之標準、意見書應記載事項、意見有誤時應負之責任等相關配套措施均付之闕如。常常導致併購中獨立專家僅為企業經營者的橡皮圖章，形式上為併購價格公平性背書，實質上卻從未獨立、客觀、專業、詳盡地對於併購對價的公平性進行檢驗。
本論文主要以比較法的方式進行研究，在先對於獨立專家制度於我國目前的運作情況作一個詳盡的介紹後，發現其可能具有的缺失。然後藉著介紹美國與歐盟法制中與我國獨立專家相類的制度，分別為美國併購實務常見的由投資銀行出具公平意見，以及歐盟公司法指令中之獨立專家制度，得知其各自對於此種併購對價檢查人的角色設計上有何細膩之處，以及運作上需要注意的事項，可供我國參考。最後並綜合金管會證期局草擬的「公開發行公司及其資產鑑價作業要點草案」，提出對於我國獨立專家相關問題之檢討與建議，希望使得獨立專家制度之運作更為健全後，能真正發揮立法者所期待的於企業併購中保障股東權益之功能。

關鍵字

企業併購法第六條 ； 獨立專家 ； 評價 ； 鑑價 ； 換股比例 ； 公平意見

並列摘要

As merger & acquisition(hereinafter M & A) activities are getting more and more thriving in Taiwan, the issues regarding protecting shareholders’ interest in M & A activities are getting more and more important. One of the most important issues is how to ensure the fairness of the exchange ratio for shareholders, and in order to deal with this issue, article 6 of Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act established the “independent expert” mechanism, requiring that every public corporation involved in M & A transactions retain at least one independent expert to examine the fairness of exchange ratio and issue his/her opinion to the board of directors and shareholders.

Since the independent expert mechanism was established, almost every M & A transaction’s exchange ratio has been proven fair by an independent expert, but the number of controversies over the fairness of exchange ratio has not decreased—shareholders did not believe in the opinions from independent expert, which increased the litigation cost and decreased the efficiency of transactions on a large scale.

In Chapter 2, this thesis will expatiate on the relevant regulations of independent expert in Taiwan and how this mechanism works currently, and then derive seven main problems with it, including (1) whether to maintain the requirement of retaining an independent expert in a M & A transaction; (2) should we create some exceptions when maintaining the requirement,; (3) how to ensure an independent expert’s independence; (4) how to ensure that an independent expert has enough expertise; (5) there is no uniform guideline to operate valuation process; (6) there is no uniform requirement for what should be written in an opinion; (7) an independent expert’s civil liability is unclear.

In Chapter 3 and 4, the mechanism in the United States and the European Union similar to the independent expert in Taiwan will be introduced respectively. In the United States’ M & A practice, a fairness opinion issued by an investment banker is often acquired by board of directors, because it is very critical for proving that directors have already fulfilled their duty of care in a M & A transaction. As for the European Union, Directive 78/85/EEC, 82/91/EEC, and 2005/56/EC require the member states to legislate for founding independent expert mechanism to inspect the fairness of exchange ratio in M & A transactions, which is quite similar to the independent expert in Taiwan but rather delicate in many perspectives.

In Chapter 5, this thesis will attempt to suggest some solutions for the seven problems presented in Chapter 2 by referring the United States and the European Union practice introduced in Chapter 3 and 4, hoping that these suggestions will help the independent expert mechanism in Taiwan improve and can really protect shareholders’ interest in M & A transactions.

並列關鍵字

independent expert ； fairness opinion ； FINRA Rule 5150 ； SI 2007/2974

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