高階經理人誘因薪酬比例與公司未來績效關聯性之研究

The Relationship Between the Proportion of CEO Incentive Pay and Firm Performance

陳映嵐(Yin-Lan Chen)

指導教授 ： 朱炫璉

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2012年)

摘要

我國金管會強制上市及上櫃公司於民國100年年底設置薪酬委員會，目的是監督薪酬分配之合理性與透明性，被視為監督薪酬分配合理性之重要政策。而高階經理人薪酬可分為固定本薪及激勵性薪酬，其中激勵性薪酬係代理理論中，主理人為降低利益衝突及代理成本，將高階經理人之薪酬與公司績效進行連結，其可將主理人所承擔之風險移轉予高階經理人，並釋放誘因予高階經理人促使其創造股東利益極大化。惟高階經理人為風險規避者，若超過其風險胃納程度，為鞏固自身利益，其決策可能轉趨保守，而不選擇高報酬但高風險之決策，進而使得公司績效造成邊際遞減之情況。因此本研究目的為探討高階經理人誘因薪酬比例對於公司未來績效之關聯性，是否存在非線性關係，並進一步探討高階經理人誘因薪酬之最適比例。
　　本研究以我國上市及上櫃電子業為研究對象，以2008年至2010年之年資料為樣本期間。本研究利用現金紅利佔總現金薪酬之比例做為誘因薪酬比例之代理變數，為探討高階經理人誘因薪酬比例與公司未來績效間存在之非線性關係，參酌過去文獻探討非線性關係之研究方法，於迴歸式中加入誘因薪酬比例之平方項進行迴歸。實證結果顯示，誘因薪酬比例呈現顯著正相關，其平方項呈現顯著負相關，代表高階經理人誘因薪酬比例對公司未來績效存在非線性關係，並呈現一凹函數（cancave curve），即高階經理人誘因薪酬比例可激勵高階經理人創造良好的績效，惟誘因釋放至某一程度，公司未來績效會呈現邊際遞減之情況。經微分計算，高階經理人誘因薪酬之最適比例為62.04%，即誘因薪酬達62.04%時可創造公司未來績效最大化，而超過此比例則會造成公司未來績效呈現邊際遞減情形。

關鍵字

高階經理人 ； 薪酬誘因 ； 公司未來績效

並列摘要

Financial Supervisory Commision forced listed companies to set up the Compensation Committee in 2011, the purpose is to supervise the transparency and rationalities of salary distribution. It is regarded as an important policy of supervising the rationalities of salary distribution. The CEO salaries include fixed and incentive pay. In agency theory, the principal uses pay-for-performance to motivate CEO and transfer the risk to the agent to reduce conflicts of interest and agency costs. However, CEO is risk-averse. If the risk exceeds CEO’s risk appetite, they will chose more conservative decision-making instead of high returns but high-risk decision-making. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate if the relationship between the proportion of CEO incentive pay and firm performance is non-linear In addition, I further explore the optimal proportion of CEO incentive pay.
In this study I used listed electronics companies as study sample, and study period is from 2008 to 2010. The proportion of CEO cash bonus to their total salaries is used as a proxy of the proportion of CEO incentive pay in the study. Previous studies have explored the nonlinear relationship by including the square of the proportion of CEO incentive pay in the regression equation. The empirical results show that there is a positive association between the proportion of incentive pay and firm performance. In addition, the squared term shows a significant negative effect . This indicates the proportion of CEO incentive pay and firm performance is non-linear and presents a concave function.That is, the proportion of incentive pay could motivate CEO to improve performance The performance improvement, however, becomes insignificant when the proportion already high. The study further finds the optimal proportion of incentive pay of CEO is 62.04% by using calculus.

並列關鍵字

CEO ； Incentive pay ； Performance

參考文獻

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