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  • 學位論文

台灣企業併購付款方式之選擇

The Choices of Payment Methods in Taiwan Mergers and Acquisitions

指導教授 : 古永嘉
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摘要


為檢測影響國內企業併購付款決策的因素,本研究以民國84年至民國95年曾於股市公開觀測站重大訊息宣布併購的240家台灣上市櫃公司作為研究樣本,以邏輯斯迴歸(Logit Regression)進行實證研究,探討主被併雙方公司如何在控制權威脅、財務情況、資訊不對稱、市場評價、成長機會等因素互相衝突的考量下,進行現金、現金股票併行或換股融資決策。所有變數皆經過共線性容忍度測試。實證結果指出在負債比率較低、目標公司為子公司、跨產業交易、及跨國交易時會採用現金支付,而在主被併公司相對規模較大時將採用股票支付,支持過去國內外學者研究結論。為避免變數選擇導致研究結果上的偏誤,本研究進階測試模式強韌度並加入控制變數進行探討。強韌度測試結果發現內部人持股比例和關係人交易顯著影響併購付款方式,支持控制權喪失及交易雙方資訊對稱程度會影響付款方式。另外,本研究結果發現國內金融業傾向使用現金併購;當期景氣水準較差時,主併公司會採用現金支付。本研究發現在資訊不對稱情況影響併購付款方式的衡量中具有有趣現象-主併公司及被併公司雙方會以對自身有利之風險規避作為考量,選擇對自己有利的付款方式。一方面主併公司對風險的考量使主併公司主要股東欲將合併後風險透過股票轉移至被併標的的股東身上,另一方面被併標的物公司主要股東除了對現金流動性考量及對現金的需求程度不同,因而影響接受現金或股票的意願,也因為對於買方真實價值有某種程度上的認知,在併購談判過程中影響最後支付工具的決擇。

並列摘要


In order to find out influences to payment decision in Taiwan M&As, 240 samples ever made M&A announcements on Taiwan Market Observation System are analyzed with Logit regression, to explore how bidder and target's elaborating on the conflicting influences as threat of control lose, financial conditions, information asymmetry, market evaluation, and growth opportunity would affect the cash, stock, or mixed payment decisions. Consistent with previous studies, the empirical result shows that lower debt ratio, subsidiary target, cross industry, and cross country transaction are positively related with cash payment, and relative size between bidder and target more likely leads to stock payment. To avoid variable selection bias, we also test the robustness of the model and add in extra control variables. The results show that insider's ownership and related party transaction significantly correlate with payment methods. These evidences further support that threat of control lose and information asymmetry have significant impact on payment methods. We also find in our sample that financial institutions are more likely to pay cash and bidders tend to pay stocks during high market cycles. Interestingly, we find that there is a conflict caused by information asymmetry in between the bidder and the target's payment decision. The bidder would choose a payment method in favor of himself in order to avoid risk and so does the target. Therefore, risk aversion drives the shareholders of the bidder to choose stock payment so that they can transfer the risk to shareholders of the target. On the other hand, the decision of target's shareholders is driven by liquidity of stocks and demand of cash, as well as realization of the value of bidder's stocks.

參考文獻


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