工會與公司治理

Labor Unions and Corporate Governance

張怡瑩(Yi-Ying Chang)

指導教授 ： 施懿宸

國立臺北大學/商學院/金融與合作經營學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

本研究藉由美國上市公司公開之財報及治理變數探討工會與公司治理結構之關聯性。根據利害關係人理論，進一步分析工會與公司董事會結構與工會與股東權利之關係。實證結果顯示：員工有加入工會的公司，其董事會規模較大，擁有較多的外部董事，且執行長與董事會主席常為同一人擔任。此外，此類公司的股東權利與工會呈負相關，當員工加入工會比例越高時，負向關係愈顯著。考量其他可能影響之變數後，本研究結論仍維持一致。

關鍵字

公司治理、工會效果

並列摘要

We investigate the relation between union and governance structure for firms during 2001-2006 periods. According to the stakeholder theory, we examine how union interacts with the structure of corporate board and shareholder rights separately. The results show that firms with union have larger board size, higher board independence, and CEO duality. Moreover, we find a negative relation between union and shareholder rights and this relation is particularly strong for firms with higher unionized ratio. The results hold after controlling for other potential influences. Our evidence suggests that union factor is important in shaping corporate governance structure.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Union effect

參考文獻

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