論證券詐欺民事責任—以損失因果關係為重心

A Study on Civil Liability for Securities Fraud—Focus on Loss Causation

潘怡學(Yi-Hsueh Pan)

指導教授 ： 張心悌

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

「證券詐欺」一直以來為證券法學界相當關心的議題，而在證券詐欺訴訟實務投資人舉證上經常會遇到的困難是「因果關係」與「損害賠償金額」。而就因果關係之證明而言，可分為「交易因果關係」與「損失因果關係」，其中「交易因果關係」部分，我國法院實務多已採納美國法院之作法，即允許團體訴訟之原告投資人援引「對市場詐欺理論」進而推定交易因果關係。則目前證券詐欺訴訟之爭議轉向「損失因果關係」之證明。由於我國證券詐欺主要規定之證券交易法第20條乃仿照自美國1934年證券交易法Section 10(b)及證管會所頒佈之Rule 10b-5，因此美國法院實務與學界對於Rule 10b-5中損失因果關係要件之見解為何自有參考之必要。
美國聯邦最高法院在2005年作出Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo判決，針對損失因果關係首次做出回應，明確將損失因果關係列為Rule 10b-5 訴訟上投資人所要舉證的要件之一，並且反對同案第九上訴巡迴法院所採取之「灌水股價理論」。美國聯邦最高法院認為投資人在訴訟上僅單純主張股價在買入時受到灌水，無法滿足損失因果關係，惟法院並未進一步說明投資人應如何主張與證明損失因果關係。
美國證券法學者對於損失因果關係之見解區分為採取事後損失觀點之「嚴格標準」與採取事前損失觀點之「寬鬆標準」。嚴格標準，以Coffee教授為代表，其主要是認為美國證券詐欺訴訟造成沒有效率的財富移轉，為了限制證券詐欺訴訟之提起，投資人在訴訟上必須主張與證明「真相揭露後股價下跌」方能滿足損失因果關係；寬鬆標準，以Fox教授為代表，其認為投資人容易提起證券詐欺訴訟，能達到嚇阻公開發行公司，使其不為不實財報等詐欺行為之效果，並促使股價正確。
本文認為「嚴格標準」將造成公開發行公司藉由扣留真相之方式，先發布其他無關之利空消息，當股價下跌至某程度後，始公開揭露詐欺行為，並因此避免證券詐欺損害賠償責任。如此無異於鼓勵詐欺手段高明之公司，而對誠實之公司不公平。並且在我國法下基於三個理由更不適合採取嚴格標準：一、在我國證券法制下較無發生濫訴之可能；二、證券民事訴訟損害填補之功能於我國特別重要；及，三、我國之民事訴訟制度並無如同美國之「起訴審查階段」。然採取Fox教授所主張的「寬鬆標準」將使得損失因果關係不具有過濾之功能。因而，在我國法下，本文採取「折衷標準」，即在訴訟上原告必須證明：一、不實資訊或詐欺行為造成股價灌水；二、不實資訊或詐欺行為已未支撐該股票之市場價格而導致股價下跌。

關鍵字

證券詐欺 ； 交易因果關係 ； 損失因果關係 ； 事前損失 ； 事後損失 ； 行為財務學 ； 公司財務學 ； 證券集體訴訟 ； 事件研究法

並列摘要

“Securities Fraud” always has been the issue that securities law scholars focused on, and at the court the most difficult elements for plaintiffs to prove was “causation” and “damages”. Causation contains “transaction causation” and “loss causation”, as the matter of “transaction causation”, Taiwan’s courts almost accept the method U.S. courts had been used, permitting the investor plaintiffs to use the “Fraud-on-the-Market Theory” to presume the “transaction causation”. Now the debate moves on the “loss causation”. Because Taiwan’s “general anti-fraud rules”, Article 20 of the Securities and Exchange Act, are considered as, by most of scholars, imitation of the Section 10(b) of the American Securities Exchange Act in 1934 and the Rule 10b-5 established by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, therefore, we should try to understand U.S. courts and scholars’ opinion about “loss causation”.

In 2005, U.S. Supreme Court made Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo decision, responded to the “loss causation” for the first time, Supreme Court explicitly contend the requirement of Rule 10b-5 cause of action included the “loss causation”, and refused to accept the Ninth circuit’s “inflation price theory”. Supreme Court thought investors could not satisfy the “loss causation” by claim that the stock was inflated at the time of transaction. Though Supreme Court did not clarify how to claim and prove “loss causation”.

American securities law scholars had two main different opinions on loss causation. Professor Coffee advocate “ex post view”, he thought securities fraud litigations cause too many wealth transfers, and these transfers seem likely to produce net losses in the real world. To avoid too many lawsuits could be cross the pre-trial stage, in order to satisfy loss causation investors must claim and prove “a market decline”. On the other hand, Professor Fox stand for “ex ante view”, the plaintiff could pass the pre-trial stage by claim he pay an inflated purchase price because of the defendant’s fraud. To make the stock price accurate, Fox thought we have to let the securities fraud lawsuits pass the pre-trial stage easier, which will generate deterrence effect to public corporation.

This thesis think, if we take the “ex post view”, the defendant corporation could withhold the truth and announce another bad news, until the stock price drop, the defendant corporation disclose the truth. This would encourage bad corporations, and punish honest corporations. And in Taiwan, because of three reasons this thesis holds we should not adopt the “ex post view”: (1)securities lawsuits abuses in our legal system happen rarely; (2)securities fraud lawsuits’ fulfill damages function is especially important in Taiwan; and, (3) Taiwan civil procedures do not have “pre-trial stage”. However, the “ex ante view” will make loss causation’s “filtration function” useless. As a result, in Taiwan, this thesis suggests the “corporate finance view”, that in the court investor plaintiffs must prove: (1) the stock price inflated by fraud; (2) the stock price declined because the fraud is no longer propping up the price.

並列關鍵字

securities fraud ； transaction causation ； loss causation ； ex ante loss ； ex post loss ； behavioral finance ； corporate finance ； securities class action ； event study

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