- 學位論文
董監事與重要職員責任保險需求之決定因素
Determinants of Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance
摘要
近年來國際間發生許多龐大財報舞弊事件，令社會大眾對企業經營管理產生疑問。為了重拾投資者對企業管理者的信心，各國政府陸續制定相關法規，強化企業之公司治理，保障投資人的權益，同時增加董事與管理階層的責任與相關規範。因此，董監事與管理階層即面臨相當大的個人財務風險，所以公司也會替董監事、經理人等管理階層提供保護措施，像是購買「董監事與重要職員責任保險( Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, D&O 責任保險)。由於企業購買 D&O 責任保險之行為，可能具有不同的經濟誘因與意涵，本研究之目的便是探討我國企業對 D&O 責任保險需求之決定因素。然而，我國先前有關於 D&O 責任保險之研究並不多且因樣本限制，其研究結論或許欠缺代表性。本研究現可從公開資訊觀測站取得 D&O 責任保險相關資料，其樣本可靠度高且樣本觀察值數量大幅增加，實證分析結果可比先前研究更具代表性。 在回顧文獻後，本研究將可能影響企業之因素分為三類－訴訟風險、公司治理與股權結構，探討影響企業對 D&O 責任保險需求之因素。研究預期若企業具有較高的訴訟風險，則 D&O 責任保險之需求愈高；根據監督假說(Monitoring Hypothesis)，D&O 責任保險與其他的監督機制互為替代或互補的關係，故預期公司其餘機制與 D&O 責任保險有負向關係；當企業之高階主管持有企業的股權，可能會產生掠奪效果( Entrenchment Effect )或是動機整合效果( Incentive Alignment Effect )，對D&O責任保險需求之影響尚為模糊；而法人機構投資人較有提出訴訟的能力，當持有公司股權時，公司 D&O 責任保險的需求亦較高。 本研究以我國上市及上櫃公司為研究對象，以2008年至2010年為樣本期間，剔除金融業與資料不全之觀察值後，可用之觀察值共計3,115筆，當中購買 D&O 責任保險的觀察值有1,530筆。本研究使用兩種衡量方式衡量企業對 D&O 責任保險之需求：是否投保 D&O 責任保險與保險金額，進行迴歸實證分析。實證結果顯示，是否投保 D&O 責任保險與七項實驗變數以及保險金額與四項實驗變數呈現顯著相關且符合預期。訴訟風險對 D&O 責任保險之影響較大，大多數皆與保險具有正向關係，且邊際效果之影響較大；外部董監事比例與保險具有反向關係，符合監督假說；而高階主管持股會產生動機整合效果，公司較不會購買保險。
並列摘要
In recent years, there are many financial statement fraud around the world, making the investors cast doubt on the management of the enterprise. In order to regain investors' confidence in the corporate managers, governments worldwide have worked out the relevant laws and regulations, and strengthen the corporate governance, to protect the interests of investors. At the same time, they have increased the responsibilities and related specifications of directors and the management. Therefore, the directors and the management face considerable personal financial risk, so the company will provide protective mechanisms, for example, the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O insurance), for their directors, supervisors, managers and other management. Acts as companies purchase D&O insurance may have different economic incentives and meaning, so the purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of local companies’ demand for D&O insurance. However, previous studies about the D&O insurance in our country are few and because of the sample limitations, their findings may lack the representative. It’s now available to obtain the data of D&O insurance from the Market Observation Post System. The high reliability of the sample and a substantial increase in the number of sample observations, making the empirical results more representative than the previous study. After reviewing the literature, this study divided the factors may affect companies into three categories – the risk of litigation, corporate governance and ownership structure, to explore the determinants of enterprise’s demand for D&O insurance. This study expected that if the enterprise has a high risk of litigation, the higher the demand for D&O insurance. Under the Monitoring Hypothesis, D&O insurance and other monitoring mechanisms are substitutes or complementary relationship, it is expected that the rest of the monitoring mechanisms of the company and D&O insurance have a negative relationship. When the executives have the ownership of companies, it may raise a Entrenchment Effect or a Incentive Alignment Effect, so the relationship of executives ownership and D&O insurance is still fuzzy. The institutional investors have the ability of sue more, when they have ownership of the company, the demand of D&O insurance may be higher. The sample of this study is the listed and OTC companies of Taiwan during the period from 2008 to 2010. After excluding the financial industry and the observation that is information-insufficiency, the amounts of available observations are 3,155, which includes 1,530 observations that represent companies have the D&O insurance. This study uses two way to measure the demand for D&O insurance : whether buy the D&O insurance and the insurance amount, to do the empirical analysis. The empirical results show that whether buy the D&O insurance and seven variables as well as the insurance amount and four variables are related significantly and conform the expectation. The risk of litigation has more effect on the demand for D&O insurance, because most of the risk variables have a positive relationship with D&O insurance. The marginal effect of those variables are greater, too. The proportion of external directors’ and supervisors’ and the D&O insurance have a inverse relationship, complying with the Monitoring Hypothesis. The executives ownership raise a Incentive Alignment Effect that makes companies not to buy the insurance.