碼頭營運商在價格競爭下的最適港埠業務契約

Optimal Concession Contracts of Landlord Port Authorities under Price Competition of Terminal Operators

林彥宏(Yen-Hung Lin)

指導教授 ： 陳孝琪

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

本文參考Chen and Liu (2013a) 的架構，分析當兩家碼頭營運商進行Bertrand 價格競爭時，一個追求費用收入極大化的港務局應該如何制訂最適的港埠業務契約。我們建立了一個兩階段賽局來描述港務局及兩家碼頭營運商之間的利益互動。首先，在賽局的第一階段，港務局先宣告契約的內容。兩家碼頭營運商在得知契約內容後，則在賽局的第二階段同時且獨立地決定均衡價格。本模型考慮三種不同的收費方式：兩部收費法（two-part tariff scheme）、從量收費法（unit-fee scheme）及定額收費法（fixed-fee scheme）。我們發現，當效率較差的營運商，其邊際成本較小時，兩部收費法為港務局
的最適契約；而在其他情況下，港務局則會以兩部收費法或從量收費法作為最適契約。

關鍵字

兩部收費法 ； 從量收費法 ； 定額收費法 ； 價格競爭 ； 港埠業務契約 ； 兩階段賽局

並列摘要

Based on the framework of Chen and Liu (2013a), this thesis analyzes the optimal concession contracts of a fee-revenue maximizing landlord port authority under the price (Bertrand) competition of two terminal operators. We construct a two-stage game to describe the interactions between the port authority and terminal operators. In the first stage, the port authority announces a contract. Given the contract, two operators choose equilibrium prices independently and simultaneously in the second stage. Three types of contracts, two-part tariff scheme, unit-fee scheme and fixed-fee scheme, are considered in our model. We discover that the two-part tariff scheme is the best contract when the marginal costs of the less-efficient operator are small. In the remaining cases, the two-part tariff and the unit-fee schemes are equally preferred by the port authority.

並列關鍵字

concession contract ； fixed-fee ； price competition ； unit-fee ； two-part tariff ； two-stage game

參考文獻

[1] Chen, H.-C., and Liu, S.-M. (2013a): “Optimal Concession Contracts for Landlord Port Authorities to Maximize Fee Revenues,” International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics, forthcoming.

[2] Chen, H.-C., and Liu, S.-M. (2013b): “Optimal Concession Contracts for Landlord Port Authorities to Maximize Traffic Volumes,” Maritime Policy & Management, forthcoming.

[4] Cruz, C. O., and Marques, R. C. (2012): “Risk-Sharing in Seaport Terminal Concessions,” Transport Reviews, 32, 455-471.

[5] Davis, D. (2011): “Behavioral convergence properties of Cournot and Bertrand markets: An experimental analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 80, 443-458.

[6] Ferrari, C., and Basta, M. (2009): “Port concession fees based on the price-cap regulation: A DEA approach,” Maritime Economics & Logistics, 11, 121-135.