資訊揭露與股權結構關係之研究

The Study of the Relationship between Information Disclosure and Ownership Structure

周至文(Chin-Wen Chou)

指導教授 ： 洪嘉聲 ； 呂麒麟

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6828/KSU.2005.00030

摘要

本研究主要探討資訊揭露之程度與股權結構之間的關係以及在不同的盈餘結果之下，資訊揭露與股權結構之間的關係是否有所不同。資訊揭露是企業降低公司之內部及外部資訊不對稱的重要管道之一，而資訊揭露的程度則是決定於公司管理當局。本研究利用台灣證券暨期貨市場發展基金會針對上市、櫃公司資訊揭露情形所建立之「資訊揭露評鑑系統」首次公佈之資訊揭露評鑑結果，來探討台灣上市公司資訊揭露之程度與股權結構之間的關係。結果發現台灣上市公司中，管理者持股比率、機構投資人持股比率、獨立董監事比率與公司的資訊揭露程度成顯著的正向關係，與大股東持股比率則成顯著的負向關係。而在EPS表現較不佳的情況下，資訊揭露與股權結構的呈現不顯著的關係，而在EPS較去年度表現佳時，管理者持股對於資訊揭露的程度為顯著的正向關係，而EPS較去年表現差時，則為不顯著的關係。

關鍵字

資訊揭露評鑑系統 ； 每股盈餘 ； 股權結構 ； 資訊揭露

並列摘要

This study examines the relationship between information disclosure and ownership structure, and the disclosure incentive under different EPS conditions. Information disclosure degree was decided by the manager of the firm, which is one of the most important channels to reduce the asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. This study use the first time announced disclose report made by the Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System of SFI to explore the relationship between information disclosure and ownership structure of Taiwan stock market. The empirical results show the holding of management, institutional investor and outside directors have positive relationship with information disclosure and have negative relationship with block-holdings. Besides, these relationships were insignificant when the EPS was negative or worse than last year and when the EPS was positive or better than last year these relationships were significant.

並列關鍵字

Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking ； EPS ； ownership structure ； information disclosure

參考文獻

[2].陳明園，石雅慧，“高階經理人薪酬－代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究”，台大管理論叢，第15期，2004年12月1日，第131-166頁。

[9].Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev, “Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 24, 1998, pp.99–126.

[10].Bushee, B. J. and C. F. Noe, “Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, 2000, pp.171-202.

[11].Chau, G. K. and S. J. Gray, “Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore,” The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 37, 2002, pp.247–265.

[12].Chen, C. J. and P. B. Jaggi, “Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 19, 2000, pp.285–310.