私募股權之折價與宣告效果

過去研究私募股權的文獻在應募人特性部份，僅利用二分法將應募人區分為內部人或外部人，本研究有鑑於此分類未能考慮內部人與外部人同時參與之情況，故將應募人特性區分成三類，並以之探討私募之折價幅度與宣告效果。再者，過去探討股權集中程度與折價幅度或宣告效果之關聯的文獻，並未考量應募人之特性，因此，本研究變數中納入應募人特性，探討股權集中程度對折價幅度與宣告效果之關聯。大部份的私募公司皆與銀行保持著某種程度的往來關係，且銀行在蒐集私有資訊方面具有比較優勢，然而，目前卻未有文獻探討銀行往來關係與私募之折價幅度或宣告效果間的關聯性，因此，本研究也探討私募公司與銀行往來關係間的強度是否影響私募之折價幅度與宣告效果。最後，本研究認為若私募公司可藉由私募的宣告傳遞出有利於公司價值的正面訊息，應有助於提升私募公司與銀行間之往來關係，反之，若傳遞一負面訊息，則會降低私募公司與銀行間之往來關係。因此，本研究亦探討私募之宣告資訊對於其銀行往來關係之影響，以判斷私募資訊如何影響銀行往來關係。實證結果指出，受到私募公司之協商成本與資訊揭露成本之影響，只有內部應募人參與之折價幅度大於只有外部應募人時之折價幅度，而同時有內部應募人與外部應募人同時參與之私募，其折價幅度最大，且應募人數愈多愈具有擴大折價幅度之效果。再者，有積極應募人參與或應募人數愈多的私募，對私募之宣告效果愈具有正向的影響。另外，本研究發現股權集中程度會由於僅有內部應募人或僅有外部應募人的參與，而對折價幅度產生不同的影響。當僅內部應募人參與時，董監事的持股率與折價幅度呈顯著正相關，但當僅外部應募人參與時，董監事的持股率與折價幅度則呈顯著負相關。再者，經理人的持股則具有縮小折價幅度的抑制效果，實證發現在僅外部人參與時，經理人的持股有提升監督的效果，與宣告效果呈顯著正相關；但在僅內部人參與時，經理人的持股則對私募公司有保護的效果，與宣告效果呈顯著負相關。至於董監事的持股則與宣告效果呈顯著負相關，董監事持股愈大，愈會降低私募的宣告效果，且此關聯不會受到應募人特性之影響。實證證實銀行往來關係的強度與折價幅度間呈顯著負相關，換言之，與銀行往來關係愈好的私募公司，其折價幅度會愈小。至於銀行往來關係的強度與宣告效果之間，研究發現與應募人之動機有關，積極性私募之銀行往來關係呈顯著負相關，而消極性私募之銀行往來關係呈顯著正相關。最後，本研究發現私募之宣告資訊，僅折價幅度會影響銀行往來關係，因愈小的折價幅度代表著一正面訊息，更有助於提升銀行往來關係。

關鍵字

私募；折價；宣告效果；應募人；股權集中程度；銀行往來關係

並列摘要

Past studies on the characteristics of participating investors for private equity only used dichotomy to divide them into internal parties or external parties. As this classification fails to consider the situation whereby both internal and external parties both participate, this paper first divides participating investors into three types, and then examines the relationships between the characteristics of participating investors and the discount percentages and announcement effects of private equity. Meanwhile, past literature addressing the correlation between ownership concentration and discount percentages or the correlation between equity ownership concentration levels and announcement effects does not consider the characteristics of participating investors. Therefore, this paper incorporates the characteristics of participating investors as a research variable to explore the correlation between ownership concentration and discount percentages as well as the correlation between ownership concentration and announcement effects. Most private equity firms maintain certain relationships with banks. Also, banks have comparative advantages in collecting private information. However, there is no literature discussing the correlation between banking relationships with discount percentages or the correlation between banking relationships with announcement effects. Therefore, this paper also explores whether the intensity of banking relationships for private equity firms has influence on discount percentages and announcement effects. It is suggested that if private equity firms can deliver positive signals beneficial to company values with announcements, it should help to improve their relationships with banks. On the contrary, if a negative signal is delivered, it detriments their relationships with banks. Therefore, this paper investigates the influence of the announcement information of private equity firms on their banking relationship in order to determine the influence of private placements on banking relationships. The empirical result indicates that due to the effects of renegotiation costs and information disclosure costs of private equity firms, the discount percentage when there are only internal participating investors is greater than the discount percentage when there are only external participating investors. Meanwhile, the discount percentage is the greatest when there are both internal and external participating investors at the same time. Also, with more participating investors, the discount percentage is greater. With more participating investors or active participating investors, the announcement effect is greater. Also, this study finds that the influence of the levels of ownership concentration on discount percentages is different for the situation where the participation is only limited to internal participating investors or limited to external participating investors. When the participation is limited only to internal participating investors, there is a significantly positive correlation between the percentage of holdings by directors and supervisors and discount percentages. However, when the participation is limited only to external participating investors, there is a significantly negative correlation between the percentage of holdings by directors and supervisors and discount percentages. Meanwhile, the percentage of holdings by managers shows the effects of narrowing the discount percentage. The empirical finding indicates that when the participation is limited only to external participating investors, the percentage of holdings by managers can improve monitoring and demonstrates a positive correlation with announcement effects. When the participation is only limited to internal participating investors, the percentage of holdings by managers serves to protect the private equity firms and reports a significantly negative correlation with announcement effects. There is a significantly negative correlation between the percentage of holdings by directors and supervisors and announcement effects. With higher percentage of holdings by directors and supervisors, the announcement effect is weaker. Also, this correlation is not affected by the characteristics of participating investors. The empirical result suggests that there is a significantly negative correlation between the intensity of banking relationships and discount percentages. In other words, the better banking relationships private equity firms have, the smaller their discount percentages. As far as the intensity of banking relationships and announcement effects, this paper finds that it is related to the motives of participating investors. There is a significantly negative correlation between active participating investors and banking relationships but a significantly positive correlation between passive participating investors and banking relationships. Finally, this paper finds that only discount percentages report any influence on banking relationships when it comes to announcement information. A small discount is a positive signal and helps to boost banking relationships.