企業收益、自由現金流與投資現金流之動態關聯分析

Dynamic Relationship Between Net Income, Free Cash Flow and Investment Cash Flow of Business

朱婉瑜(Wan-Yu Chu)

指導教授 ： 丁承

國立交通大學/管理學院/經營管理研究所/碩士(2019年)

摘要

企業的自由現金流量可用於衡量償債能力和公司價值，也就是一間公司營運能力能夠帶來多少現金，當需要償還債務、面臨風險時是否有充足資源來應付，然而自由現金流量衍生了代理問題，因資金持有人與代理人間的資訊不對稱，兩者目標不一致，因此代理人可能從事違背委託人目標的行為，而自由現金流量也有著諸多代理成本問題，使得自由現金流量的運用及衡量成為值得討論的議題。因此本研究基於代理理論與自由現金流量假說，探討企業獲利、自由現金流量與投資現金流之間的動態關聯，實證結果表明董監持股比例會控制自由現金流量的成長，亦發現此三者之間的關係會隨著企業的產業類別及規模而有不同的變化。

關鍵字

過度投資 ； 代理問題 ； 自由現金流量假說

並列摘要

Business’solvency and value can be evaluated by free cash flow, that is , a corporate’s operation ability to make money and When repaying loan and encountering crisis, whether business has enough resource. However, free cash flow arise agent problems because Information asymmetry exist between manager and business owner, and they might have different intention toward benefit. As a result, manager might pursue their max profit, this is agent cost behind free cash flow and also made it a arguable issue. In hope of discover the dynamic relationship between net income, free cash flow and investment cash flow, this article is based on agent thesis and free cash flow hypothesis, and our empirical results show that Stocks Holding Ratio by Directors and Supervisors would influence the relationship and also changed by industries and business scale.

並列關鍵字

over investment ； agent problem ； free cash flow hypothesis

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