透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.144.252.201
  • 學位論文

iPhone破壞性創新下,執行長權力、組織資本及管理者能力與企業價值之關聯性

The Relationship Between CEO Power, Organization Capital, Managerial Ability and Firm Value Under the Disruptive Innovation of iPhone

指導教授 : 鍾惠民 謝文良

摘要


執行長權力對公司價值的影響未有定論,又組織資本為企業經營管理、組織結構甚至文化及人力資源之結合,不僅可以使公司生產效率提升,並能增加產出,再者,將同產業中管理者能力由高至低分為十等分,表現最好與最差的等分在ROA的表現上相差約3%,管理者能力亦對公司價值影響力甚大;另一方面,iPhone的破壞性創新將IT產業迎向新的格局,本研究欲探討,是否執行長權力大且管理者能力好的公司,能透過組織資本的投入來面對iPhone的破壞性創新並且增加企業價值。 本研究結果顯示,在IT產業中,執行長權力大的公司能做出較正確的組織資本投入決策,進而提升公司價值,且較集中的執行長權力能夠透過組織資本投入決策來降低企業價值變動,進而降低風險,又執行長權力大且管理者能力好的公司,會透過組織資本投入造成企業價值變動幅度增加;在non-IT產業中,執行長權力大的公司,由於做出的決策時常是次佳的,組織資本的投入反而會降低公司價值,且執行長權力較大可能會做出次佳的組織資本投入決策,進而增加公司價值變動幅度;對於超額報酬之變動幅度而言,無論在任何產業中,執行長權力大且管理者能力好的公司,會透過組織資本投入造成企業超額報酬變動幅度增加。

並列摘要


Previous studies on the relationship between CEO power and firm value have not yet to attain a consistent conclusion. Organization capital is a combination of management, organizational structure and human resource, which is an intangible asset that could help firms to generate sustainable competitive advantages. Moreover, managerial ability is also an important factor of impact on firm value, there are 3% ROA performance differences between the firms with the top decile of managerial ability and the lowest. On the other hand, the disruptive innovation of iPhone had a great impact on IT industry. Therefore, this study would like to investigate the relationship between CEO power, organization capital, managerial ability and firm value in the IT industry under disruptive innovation of iPhone. Our empirical results show that in IT industry, a powerful CEO will increase firm value and lower the variability of firm value by investing in organization capital. Furthermore, organizational capital will pose a risk for firms when CEO is powerful and managerial ability is better. In non-IT industry, organizational capital will increase the variability of firm value when CEO is powerful. With regard to the variability of excess return, organizational capital will increase the variability of firm’s excess return when CEO is powerful and managerial ability is better.

參考文獻


1. Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of financial studies, 18(4), 1403-1432.
2. Anderson, M. C., Banker, R. D., & Janakiraman, S. N. (2003). Are selling, general, and administrative costs “sticky”? Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1), 47-63.
3. Bainbridge, S. M. (2002). Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. Nw. UL Rev., 97, 547.
4. Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1169-1208.
5. Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of corporate Finance, 3(3), 189-220.

延伸閱讀